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1035 
DISCREDITING ACCREDITATION?: ANTITRUST 
AND LEGAL EDUCATION 
MARINA LAO
*
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For almost eighty years, the American Bar Association (ABA) has set 
minimum educational standards for American law schools, granting 
accreditation to those schools that complied with them, and denying it to 
those that did not.
1
 In theory, ABA accreditation is nothing more than an 
expression of the organization’s considered professional opinion on the 
quality of different law schools. After all, the ABA does not compel law 
schools to seek ABA approval. And law schools may decline to comply with 
ABA standards, should they be willing to forego accreditation. In practice, 
however, ABA accreditation is critical for the existence of most law schools 
because, in over forty states, only graduates from ABA-accredited law 
schools are entitled to sit for the bar examination.
2
 Schools whose graduates 
have no chance of being admitted to the bar because of their exclusion from 
the bar examination would naturally have difficulty attracting enough 
students to be financially viable.
3
 The system, in effect, imposes a barrier to 
 
 
 * Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. Email: laomarin@shu.edu. I would 
like to thank David Jake Barnes, Michael Risinger, Charles Sullivan, and Spencer Weber Waller for 
their thoughts and comments. I am also grateful for the suggestions made by participants at the faculty 
colloquium at the University of Connecticut School of Law where I first raised some of the issues 
presented in this Article. Finally, my thanks go to the library staff at Seton Hall University School of 
Law, especially Maja Basioli, for their invaluable research assistance. 
 1. For a discussion of the history of American legal education, including the genesis of ABA 
control over the accreditation process, see RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 40-73 (1989); 
ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S 
(1983); Harry First, Competition in the Legal Education Industry (I), 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 333-400 
(1978) [hereinafter Competition I]; Harry First, Competition in the Legal Education Industry (II): An 
Antitrust Analysis, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1049, 1050-65 (1979) [hereinafter Competition II]. 
 2. See SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N & NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 2000 
10-11 (2000) [hereinafter BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS]. Additionally, the ABA is recognized by 
the United States Department of Education as the sole accrediting body for law schools, which enables 
students at the accredited schools to obtain federal financial assistance for their education. Complaint 
at 3, United States v. Am. Bar Ass’n, No. 95-1211(CR) (D.D.C. filed June 27, 1995), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f0200/0254.htm [hereinafter Complaint]. 
 3. There are presently 183 ABA-approved and 21 non ABA-approved law schools in the United 
States. Of the 21 non ABA-approved schools, 19 are located in states that do not require graduation 
from an ABA-accredited law school as a condition for sitting for the bar examination (16 in California, 
2 in Massachusetts, 1 in Alabama), and only two are located in states that do have such requirement 
(Kansas and Florida). From this data, it is clear that non ABA-approved law schools have difficulty 
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entry and impedes competition in legal education.
4
 
Despite this fact, rarely anyone, not even federal antitrust officials, would 
contend that accreditation is inherently anticompetitive and hence must be 
treated as per se illegal under the Sherman Act.
5
 This perspective likely exists 
because accreditation is widely acknowledged to serve a procompetitive 
function as well, by providing consumers with information about quality that 
they need to make informed decisions on complex professional services.
6
 In 
other words, to the extent that ABA accreditation informs the public which 
schools, in the organization’s opinion, offer legal education of acceptable 
quality, it has the potential of benefitting consumers by protecting 
prospective students from substandard schools and future clients from 
unqualified practitioners.
7
 
However, in any accreditation program where market participants wield 
the power to exclude, there is an inherent conflict of interest and a risk of 
anticompetitive abuse,
8
 for even the most selfless and well-intentioned 
 
 
surviving in states that limit the bar examination to those with J.D. degrees from ABA-approved 
schools. See AM. BAR ASS’N & LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA-APPROVED 
LAW SCHOOLS (2000) [hereinafter OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA-APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS] (listing all 
183 ABA-accredited law schools); BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS, supra note 2, at 10-11 (listing 
states in which graduates of non ABA-approved schools are eligible to sit for the bar examination); 
BARRON’S GUIDE TO LAW SCHOOLS 557-63 (14th ed. 2000) [hereinafter BARRON’S GUIDE] (listing 
non ABA-accredited law schools). 
 4. See generally, Competition I, supra note 1, at 314-22 (describing legal education as fitting an 
economic model); Competition II, supra note 1, at 1099-101 (characterizing the ABA accreditation 
system as a cartel of legal educators engaged in a boycott of unaccredited law schools in order to 
control the legal education market); George B. Shepherd & William G. Shepherd, Scholarly 
Restraints? ABA Accreditation and Legal Education, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 2091, 2219-29 (1996) 
(contending that the ABA accreditation system is illegal per se as a horizontal price-fixing agreement 
among law faculty, enforced by a boycott). But see Clark C. Havighurst & Peter M. Brody, 
Accrediting and the Sherman Act, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1994, at 199 (1994) (arguing 
that accreditation, standing alone, is not a restraint but merely an expression of opinion on quality by 
the accrediting body, and that the proper way to approach the problem of potential anticompetitive 
results of accreditation is to ensure more information is produced). 
 5. See Competitive Impact Statement at 16, United States v. Am. Bar Ass’n, No. 95-1211(CR) 
(D.D.C. filed June 27, 1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f1000/1034.htm (last visited 
May 16, 2001) [hereinafter Competitive Impact Statement] (acknowledging that many of the ABA 
accreditation standards implicate educational concerns and that it was unclear whether these standards 
were “anticompetitive or set a procompetitive minimum educational standard for law school 
programs”). The Supreme Court is also generally unwilling to condemn restraints adopted by 
professional associations as per se unlawful. See infra notes 220-21 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra Part IV.C.1. 
 7. One commentator has argued, however, that the accreditation system is a price fixing 
agreement of law school faculty enforced by a boycott of the unaccredited schools and should be 
treated as per se illegal. See Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 4, at 2219-29. 
 8. As early as 1976, the Federal Trade Commission was concerned that the Liaison Committee 
on Medical Education, the accrediting body for medical schools that the American Medical 
Association and its Council on Medical Education dominated, was being used to limit the number of 
doctors entering the field. Therefore, the FTC urged the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
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decision makers might find it difficult to consistently make neutral decisions 
or assessments on issues bearing direct implications on their own status, self-
identity, and well-being. For this reason, despite the general benefits 
attributed to accreditation, subjecting it to some level of antitrust scrutiny is 
appropriate. 
However, applying the Sherman Act to law school accreditation is not an 
easy task. It raises not only perplexing legal questions concerning state 
action, petitioning immunity (commonly referred to as the Noerr doctrine), 
and the First Amendment, but also various educational and other social 
policy issues. It is probably due to these complications that the ABA has 
faced only a handful of private antitrust suits challenging its accreditation 
practices and has never lost any of them.
9
 However, the most recent of these 
actions, Massachusetts School of Law at Andover v. American Bar 
Association,
10
 prompted a related Department of Justice antitrust action, 
which was eventually settled in a consent decree wherein the ABA agreed to 
discontinue certain accreditation practices.
11
 While a consent decree has no 
precedential force, the ABA’s capitulation, or at least its failure to litigate and 
aggressively assert immunity doctrines that had successfully shielded it from 
antitrust scrutiny in the past, may well increase its vulnerability and inspire 
more sustained accreditation-related challenges in the future.
12
  
 
 
to terminate the Liaison Committee’s status as an accrediting agency. FTC Criticizes AMA 
Involvement in Accreditation of Medical Schools, [Jan.-June] Antitrust & Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 802, 
at A-4, A-4 to A-6 (Feb. 22, 1977). The concerns raised about the accrediting of medical schools 
would clearly apply to law schools as well. 
 9. See Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 107 F.3d 1026, 1034-38 (3d Cir. 
1997) (dismissing unaccredited law school’s antitrust action against the ABA on state action and 
petitioning immunity grounds); Feldman v. Gardner, 661 F.2d 1295, 1304-08 (D.C. Cir. 1981) 
(holding that D.C. Court of Appeals is entitled to state action immunity for limiting bar admission to 
graduates of ABA-approved schools), vacated by 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Brandt v. Am. Bar Ass’n, No. 
CIV.A.3:96-cv-2606D, 1997 WL 279762 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (dismissing suit brought against the ABA 
over its failure to grant accreditation to a law school on petitioning immunity grounds); Zavaletta v. 
Am. Bar Ass’n, 721 F. Supp. 96, 98 (E.D. Va. 1989) (dismissing suit brought by students at 
unaccredited law school against the ABA on First Amendment grounds).  
 10. 107 F.3d 1026 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 11. United States v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 934 F. Supp. 435, 436 (D.D.C. 1996). After receiving 
complaints from MSL, the Department of Justice initiated an investigation into the ABA accreditation 
process and subsequently filed suit against the ABA. See John Yemma, Law School Loses Fight with 
Bar Association, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 7, 1997, at B4. 
 12. Probably one of the most intriguing unaccredited law schools to emerge in recent years is 
Concord University School of Law, the nation’s first completely on-line law school. “Based” in 
California, Concord is a division of Kaplan, Inc., the well-known “test-prep” company, which is a 
wholly owned subsidiary of the Washington Post Company. In addition to being backed by Kaplan 
and the Washington Post, Concord also enjoys the very public support of Harvard Law School’s 
Arthur Miller, who serves on the school’s board of directors. See Wendy Davis, Law School Without 
the Paper Chase: Internet-based Schools May Change Not Only the Way Law Is Studied but Also Who 
Studies It, N.J. LAW J., Sept. 27, 1999, at 1B, 2B; Concord Law School, at 
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This Article addresses the major antitrust issues concerning ABA 
accreditation. The first issue pertains to the reach of the unsettled state action 
and petitioning immunity doctrines, and the First Amendment. The analysis 
of state action and petitioning immunity draws a distinction between restraint 
on competition flowing from decisions to grant or deny accreditation and 
their associated state use on the one hand, and restraints on competition 
emanating from the accreditation standards themselves on the other. This 
Article concludes that, though the decisions may be immunized, neither 
doctrine clearly exempts restraints resulting from the accreditation standards 
from antitrust liability. With respect to the First Amendment defense, this 
Article takes issue both with the characterization of accreditation as mere 
speech and with the view that the First Amendment absolutely protects pure 
speech effectuating a restraint on competition. 
Following this discussion, the Article looks at the overall anticompetitive 
impact of the ABA accreditation program. Every analysis of 
anticompetitiveness requires, of course, a showing of harmful effects on 
competition, which should be relatively straightforward here because ABA 
accreditation almost certainly has an adverse output and price effect on legal 
education and, possibly, legal services. However, the purpose of the 
accreditation program, the legitimacy of that purpose, and the means of 
effectuating it are all much more complicated to ascertain. 
Accreditation of professional education (and, in fact, all professional self-
regulation) is often said to benefit consumers. In the case of legal education, 
consumers include two groups—consumers of legal education and 
consumers of legal services. The alleged benefit is the provision of otherwise 
unavailable information regarding the quality of education or services—
information that enables consumers to make informed market choices 
without incurring high search costs.
13
 Whatever its merits in other situations, 
however, the strength of this claim may be weaker when applied to legal 
education and services than when applied to more scientific and technically 
sophisticated areas, such as medicine.
14
 
 
 
http://www.concordlawschool/com/kaplanconnection.htm (last visited May 27, 2001). As a virtual law 
school, Concord is clearly ineligible for ABA approval under current standards. However, assuming 
that its graduates perform well on the California bar examination (California being one of the few 
states that allow graduates of non ABA-approved schools to take the state bar examination), it is 
conceivable that Concord might challenge the ABA’s accreditation standards. With its corporate 
backing, Concord would certainly have the ability to engage in protracted antitrust litigation, should it 
choose to do so. Or it might wage an uphill, state-by-state battle to try to secure waivers that would 
allow its graduates to take the bar examination in every state. 
 13. See infra Part IV.C.1. 
 14. See infra notes 265-68 and accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss4/2
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Another possible justification is that accreditation provides quality 
assurance for legal education.
15
 In light of clear Supreme Court 
pronouncements indicating that general welfare claims will not justify an 
otherwise anticompetitive restraint,
16
 it might seem, at first, that quality 
protection can never be considered a legitimate goal of accreditation. 
However, because educational policy implications probably make such an 
approach undesirable, I draw on the market failure theory, particularly that of 
externalities, to argue that quality assurance in legal education can be 
construed as a competitive benefit and, therefore, a legitimate objective for 
accreditation.
17
 
Acceptance of the view that, in principle, quality considerations may 
justify the constraints of accreditation does not mean, however, that the 
overall purpose and effect of the ABA accreditation program is necessarily 
legitimate. Because there are obviously different degrees of quality, the 
ABA’s objective in accreditation must be more precisely defined if it is to be 
meaningful. This Article argues that a more accurate characterization of the 
ABA’s goal is the promotion of quality as quality is defined in an elite 
system of education, and that this objective is unreasonable because a lesser 
education suffices for many practicing attorneys.
18
  
Despite my conclusion that aspects of the ABA accreditation program are 
anticompetitive, the antitrust laws may not be the best tool to bring about 
drastic changes with important policy implications. Courts might be 
unwilling to second-guess the ABA’s motivations or its policy choices or to 
engage in the kind of policymaking that is essential in crafting an effective 
remedy. But regardless of whether it can survive an antitrust attack, the ABA 
should consider overhauling its accreditation standards to allow the operation 
of nonelite style law schools, not only because the current standards are 
unreasonably restrictive, but also because of their unfair social 
consequences.
19
 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II briefly describes the ABA 
accreditation system, without detailed reference to specific procedures or 
standards. Part III then analyzes the scope of the antitrust state action and 
petitioning immunity doctrines, and the First Amendment free speech clause 
as it relates to accreditation practices. Part IV develops arguments for 
concluding that the ABA accreditation system is anticompetitive. And Part V 
 
 
 15. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 16. See infra notes 269-74 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 18. See infra Part IV.C.3. 
 19. See infra Part V. 
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concludes by noting that, even if the current accreditation system can 
withstand an antitrust challenge, relaxing the ABA’s accreditation standards 
is desirable for policy reasons. 
II. LAW SCHOOL ACCREDITATION 
The ABA administers law school accreditation through its Section of 
Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar (Section of Legal Education), 
which was created in 1893 and began its accrediting function in 1921.
20
 The 
ABA’s Consultant on Legal Education, who has traditionally been a legal 
educator, manages the day-to-day operation of the accreditation process.
21
 
Supervising all accreditation matters for the Section of Legal Education is its 
Council, and assisting the Council are two committees: a Standards Review 
Committee and an Accreditation Committee. The Standards Review 
Committee reviews and recommends changes on accreditation standards and 
their interpretations, and the Accreditation Committee oversees site 
inspections of new law schools seeking accreditation (as well as that of 
approved schools seeking reaccreditation every seven years) and makes 
initial recommendations to the Council on these applications.
22
 
Central to any accreditation program are standards setting minimum 
requirements that must be satisfied for approval to be granted. The ABA’s 
standards cover many aspects of the operation of a law school, such as its 
curriculum, faculty, administration, admissions, library resources, and 
physical facilities.
23
 Included among them are rules requiring a three-year full 
time program for a J.D. degree,
24
 limiting the student-faculty ratio,
25
 
 
 
 20. See ABEL, supra note 1, at 46; OFFICE OF THE CONSULTANT ON LEGAL EDUCATION TO THE 
AM. BAR ASS’N, THE ABA’S ROLE IN THE LAW SCHOOL ACCREDITATION PROCESS 1 (1997) 
[hereinafter ABA’S ROLE]; STEVENS, supra note 1, at 95. 
 21. See Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 5, at 4-5. 
 22. Id. at 2-4. See also ABA’S ROLE, supra note 20. For the procedural rules of the accreditation 
process, see OFFICE OF THE CONSULTANT ON LEGAL ED. TO THE AM. BAR ASS’N, RULES OF 
PROCEDURE FOR THE APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS (1999) [hereinafter ABA RULES OF PROCEDURE]. 
For the accreditation standards, see OFFICE OF THE CONSULTANT ON LEGAL ED., AM. BAR ASS’N, 
ABA STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS (1999) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS]. 
 23. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 22. The core of the standards was adopted in 1973 and 
periodically amended since then. The most significant changes came about as a result of the 1995 
consent decree signed by the ABA in the civil suit brought by the Department of Justice. Under the 
terms of the consent decree, the ABA can no longer collect faculty salary data or consider faculty 
compensation in accreditation, bar accreditation of for-profit schools, or prohibit acceptance of transfer 
credits from unaccredited schools. United States v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 934 F. Supp. 435, 436 (D.D.C. 
1996). The ABA also made other changes in 1996, including eliminating a teaching load limit and the 
requirement of periodic sabbaticals; allowing some counting of adjuncts in the calculation of the 
student-faculty ratio; and making minor changes in the language of a few other standards. 
 24. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 22, std. 304(b). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss4/2
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prohibiting academic credit for bar review courses,
26
 prohibiting 
correspondence schools,
27
 and imposing certain requirements on library 
resources
28
 and law school physical facilities.
29
 The ABA makes its approval 
or denial decisions based on an application of these standards,
30
 and it 
apprises the states of its accreditaton decisions.
31
 The ABA also annually 
provides the states with the Review of Legal Education in the United States, 
the current ABA accreditation standards, and any proposed modifications.
32
  
The ABA’s accreditation decisions initially had little impact because no 
state before 1928 required graduation from any law school (let alone an 
ABA-accredited one) as a condition for admission to the bar.
33
 In a majority 
of jurisdictions, anyone could become a licensed attorney through 
apprenticeship and passing the bar examination.
34
 By 1958, however, the 
ABA and the Association of American Law Schools (AALS)
35
 had prevailed 
upon all but fourteen jurisdictions to require candidates for the bar 
examination to be graduates of ABA-approved schools.
36
 Today, graduation 
from an ABA school is a condition for taking the bar in forty-three 
jurisdictions.
37
 
 
 
 25. Id. std. 402, interps. 402-1, 402-2. 
 26. Id. std. 302(f). 
 27. Id. stds. 304(b), 304(g). 
 28. Id. std. 606. 
 29. Id. stds. 701-03. For further discussion of some of the accreditation standards, see infra notes 
290-99 and accompanying text. 
 30. It is not the purpose of this Article to describe or analyze the procedural aspects of 
accreditation, such as how applications for accreditation are processed, how on-site inspections of new 
schools (or periodic reinspections of approved schools) are performed, or how accreditation decisions 
are actually made. The focus of this Article is, instead, on the effects of the substantive standards. For 
a description of the accreditation procedures, see ABA RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 22; 
Competition II, supra note 1, at 1067-69. 
 31. Mass. School of Law at Andover, Inc. v. American Bar Ass’n, 107 F.3d 1026, 1030 (3d Cir. 
1997).   
 32. Id. 
 33. See STEVENS, supra note 1, at 174. See also Competition I, supra note 1, at 333-34 
(describing vast differences among law schools in the post–Civil War period and the fact that they 
were not the only path to the bar). 
 34. See STEVENS, supra note 1, at 174. 
 35. The AALS is an association of American law schools formed in 1900 as an entity separate 
from the ABA. ABEL, supra note 1, at 46. Its current members are all ABA-accredited schools. Mass. 
Sch. of Law, 107 F.3d at 1030. The AALS accredits law schools only in the sense that it evaluates 
them for membership in the association, but its decisions, unlike those of the ABA, have no impact on 
bar admission rules. See Mass. Sch. of Law, 107 F.3d at 1030. See generally ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCH., 
2000 HANDBOOK art. 6 (2000) (listing requirements for AALS membership); Competition II, supra 
note 1, at 1078-80 (describing the close relationship between the ABA and AALS). 
 36. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 207-08. 
 37. See BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS, supra note 2, at 10-11. The only jurisdictions 
permitting graduates of non ABA-approved schools to take the bar examination are Alabama, 
California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, Tennessee, and Virginia. Id. In addition to 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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A common thread running through most of the accreditation standards is 
their effectuation of an elite-style law school.
38
 While no precise definition 
for an “elite” education exists,39 certain attributes are often recognized as 
typical of any elite school. Among them are selective enrollment; relatively 
low student-faculty ratios; courses taught predominantly by full-time faculty, 
rather than part-time adjuncts; faculty who engage in scholarly research and 
writing in addition to teaching; an academic or intellectual, rather than 
utilitarian, approach toward education; libraries with extensive collections; 
and good physical facilities.
40
 The ABA standards appear to be consistent 
with these expectations.
41
 For example, rules governing the student-faculty 
ratio and how adjuncts figure into the calculation of that ratio ensure the 
primary reliance on full-time faculty for instruction and a low student-faculty 
ratio. Furthermore, the barring of academic credit for bar review type courses 
reflects the elite system’s vision of education as having more intellectual 
depth. Other standards, likewise, perpetuate the elite model.
42
 
Another commonality of the standards is that they tend to raise the price 
of a law school education.
43
 Costs would clearly be lower for students, for 
instance, if law schools could have high student-faculty ratios, predominantly 
 
 
a degree from an ABA-accredited law school, admission to the bar in most states currently requires a 
college degree or three years of college study, passing of the state bar examination, and approval of 
character and fitness by the committee governing bar admissions. Id. (listing bar admission 
requirements for each state). 
 38. Within the ranks of the many ABA-accredited law schools, some are, of course, considered 
more prestigious than others. My use of the terms “elite-style” or “elite-model” law school refers not 
to the prestige factor of the individual law schools, but to the form of educational system that is 
followed by all accredited law schools, ranging from the most to the least prestigious. I argue that the 
ABA accreditation system requires that all law schools follow the elite model. In contrast, some 
undergraduate colleges and universities (such as the Ivy League schools and other prestigious schools) 
follow the elite model while others (such as community and less prestigious four-year colleges) do not. 
 39. A dictionary definition of elite is “the choice part . . . or socially superior group.” WEBSTER’S 
NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 268 (1989). 
 40. Since there is no real definition of what an “elite” school is, this description is largely based 
on what I believe to be generally held perceptions of such schools. See also Competition I, supra note 
1, at 323-26 (arguing that the AALS monopoly over legal education allows legal educators to indulge 
their elite preferences, which include full-time teaching, time to pursue nonclassroom tasks, a bright 
student body, a large library, and a degree of freedom from economic discipline).  
 41. Standards that were changed or eliminated under the consent decree (or thereafter) also 
promoted an elite-model law school. They include ensuring that faculty are paid adequately—
presumably to attract a high caliber of faculty who would not have to supplement their income with 
part-time practice—and that faculty have periodic sabbaticals and limited teaching loads to facilitate 
academic research and writing. See United States v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 934 F. Supp. 435, 436 (D.D.C. 
1996), modified by 135 F. Supp. 2d 28 (2001), and modified by 2001 WL 514376 (2001) (listing 
prohibited conduct under consent decree). 
 42. For a more extensive discussion of some of the standards and how they implement the elite-
model law school, see infra notes 290-99 and accompanying text. 
 43. For a more extensive discussion of the high costs of attending law school, see infra notes 
338-40 and accompanying text. 
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2002] ANTITRUST AND LEGAL EDUCATION 1043 
 
 
 
 
use adjuncts, rely on on-line sources for its “library,” offer two-year instead 
of three-year programs, and so forth. From an antitrust perspective, it is the 
standards’ exclusion of less expensive schools with more humble 
aspirations—that might nonetheless provide an acceptable (though not first-
rate) legal education—that raises antitrust concerns. 
As previously noted, the ABA faced two serious antitrust challenges in 
the mid-1990s: a private suit and a related Department of Justice action.
44
 
After being denied ABA approval, the Massachusetts School of Law at 
Andover (MSL), a school operating on a low budget and in conscious 
defiance of many ABA rules, sued the ABA alleging that the enforcement of 
its standards amounted to a group boycott against MSL and an agreement to 
fix prices in violation of the Sherman Act.
45
 The case was dismissed, on a 
summary judgment motion, on antitrust state action and petitioning immunity 
grounds,
46
 but not before it had triggered a related Department of Justice civil 
antitrust action against the ABA.
47
 
The government’s case alleged that the law school accreditation process 
had been captured by legal educators
48
 and that the ABA, under these 
educators’ influence, formulated and enforced anticompetitive standards and 
engaged in a group boycott of schools failing to achieve those standards.
49
 
 
 
 44. In addition to these two cases and the cases cited in supra note 9, the ABA also faced a 
challenge from Western State University College of Law (WSU) in the mid-1970s, although no suit 
was filed. WSU, a for-profit law school in California, was ineligible for ABA approval because of the 
nonprofit standard in existence at that time. Denied ABA approval, WSU applied for accreditation 
from a recognized regional accrediting agency in order to allow its students to participate in federal 
financial aid programs. When the ABA attempted to interfere with WSU’s efforts, WSU filed a 
complaint against the ABA with the Department of Education. This complaint prompted a Department 
of Education investigation and a Department threat to remove the ABA’s accrediting status. The ABA 
eventually decided to delete the standard prohibiting proprietary schools but did not accredit WSU, 
presumably because of other deficiencies. See STEVENS, supra note 1, at 244-45; Competition II, supra 
note 1, at 1082-86.  
 45. Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 107 F.3d 1026, 1031 (3d Cir. 1997). 
For a good analysis of this case, see Peter James Kolovos, Note, Antitrust Law and Nonprofit 
Organizations: The Law School Accreditation Case, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 689 (1996). 
 46. Mass. Sch. of Law, 107 F.3d at 1034-38. The court determined that MSL’s injuries did not 
stem from the ABA’s actions. Rather, the states’ exclusion of non ABA-approved schools’ graduates 
from the bar examination was the direct cause of injuries. Therefore, state action and petitioning 
immunity doctrines provided antitrust immunity. For a discussion of these two antitrust immunity 
doctrines, see infra Part III. 
 47. See Complaint, supra note 2. 
 48. At that time, approximately ninety percent of the members of the Section of Legal Education, 
all members of the Standards Review Committee, and a majority of the members of the Accreditation 
Committee were legal educators. Furthermore, site inspection teams that performed on-site evaluations 
of law schools for accreditation purposes typically consisted of an overwhelming majority of legal 
educators. See Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 5, at 4-5. 
 49. The standards and practices alleged to be anticompetitive include the following: the 
requirement that faculty compensation be comparable to that of other similarly situated ABA-approved 
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The case was eventually terminated with a consent decree in which the ABA 
agreed to discontinue a few of the challenged practices
50
 and alter the 
composition of the committees and organizations that control the 
accreditation process in order to reduce legal educators’ role in the process.51 
Because the ABA settled the case without first insisting on summary 
disposition based on the state action and petitioning immunity doctrines, its 
earlier invincibility on these threshold issues is now more questionable; it 
would be unsurprising to see more resolute arguments for limiting the scope 
of these doctrines in the future. 
III. SCOPE OF STATE ACTION, PETITIONING, AND FREE SPEECH 
The antitrust immunity doctrines are often said to express “the principle 
that the antitrust laws regulate business, not politics”:52 state action “protects 
the States’ acts of governing, and [petitioning immunity protects] the 
citizens’ participation in government.”53 But, other than this truism, not much 
else is settled about the two doctrines, least of all their implications for 
private standard setting—such as accreditation—that has been adopted by the 
State. The following discussion seeks to make sense of these two ambiguous 
immunity doctrines in the law school accreditation context.
54
 It will also 
 
 
schools, the prohibition against granting transfer students credit for courses completed at unaccredited 
law schools, the requirement that schools be nonproprietary, the exclusion of adjunct faculty in the 
calculation of the student-faculty ratio, limitations on faculty teaching loads, the requirement that 
faculty be granted periodic sabbaticals, the prohibition against bar review courses, and a few 
interpretations of standards relating to facilities and resources. See id. at 5-9. 
 50. See United States v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 934 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1996). Under the consent 
decree, the ABA is enjoined from adopting or enforcing any standard that (1) effectively imposes 
compensation requirements for legal educators as a condition for accreditation (including the 
collection of salary data and using that data in connection with accreditation review); (2) prohibits 
member schools from enrolling graduates of unaccredited law schools in a post-J.D. program; (3) 
prohibits member schools from granting transfer students credit for courses completed at an 
unaccredited law school (except that transfer credits can be limited to no more than one-third of the 
total credits required for graduation); or (4) denies accreditation on the basis that the school is 
proprietary. Id. at 436. 
 51. Structural changes mandated by the consent decree include the following: no more than 50% 
of the members of the Council to the Section of Legal Education, the Accreditation Committee, and 
the Standards Review Committee, and no more than 40% of the nominating committee for the officers 
of the Section of Legal Education may be law school deans or faculty; site-inspection teams will, to 
the extent possible, consist of at least two members who are not legal educators; and an independent 
consultant, who is not a legal educator, will be hired to assist in validating all standards and 
interpretations. Id. at 437. For a discussion of the composition of ABA councils, committees, and site-
inspection teams at the time the Department of Justice brought the suit against the ABA, see supra 
note 48. 
 52. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 383 (1991). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Not only have the state action and petitioning immunity doctrines insulated the ABA from 
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examine a further contention that accreditation is pure speech entitled to First 
Amendment protection, independent of the petitioning immunity doctrine. 
A. Antitrust Immunity: State Action and Petitioning 
1. The Antitrust State Action Doctrine
55
 
State action immunity is intended to accommodate two conflicting 
interests: the federal antitrust interest in promoting competition (which is 
premised on the notion that competition advances consumer welfare)
56
 and 
the state interest in regulation (which generally restricts competition).
57
 The 
 
 
antitrust scrutiny in connection with accreditation, they have also shielded lawyers in cases involving 
bar examination grading, unauthorized practice rules, and advertising restrictions. See, e.g., Hoover v. 
Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984) (dismissing, on state action immunity grounds, an antitrust action 
brought against a committee appointed by the Arizona Supreme Court challenging the bar examination 
grading system adopted by that committee); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (holding 
a lawyer-advertising ban unconstitutional, but also holding that the ban was not subject to antitrust 
review because of the state action immunity doctrine); Lawline v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 956 F.2d 1378 (7th 
Cir. 1992) (dismissing, on state action immunity grounds, an antitrust action challenging rules related 
to the unauthorized practice of law). 
 55. The term “state action” as used in antitrust law is different from the concept of state action 
used in civil rights cases under the Fourteenth Amendment. The definition of state action is relatively 
narrow in antitrust law, as will be discussed infra; however, it is much broader under Fourteenth 
Amendment analysis. In the Fourteenth Amendment context, state action has been held to extend even 
to certain private actions with a quasi-public character. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 18-1 to 18-7 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the state action doctrine within the 
constitutional law context). Consequently, conclusions as to what constitutes state action under 
constitutional law do not apply to the question of whether state action is implicated under antitrust law. 
The difference between the two state action concepts is most evident in the treatment of municipal 
action, which is ipso facto state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes but not for antitrust 
purposes. For municipal or state agency acts to constitute state action under antitrust law, there must 
be clear authorization from the state legislature or, where applicable, the state supreme court. See infra 
notes 67-69 and accompanying text. 
 56. See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (noting the goal of antitrust 
and the premise underlying that goal). 
 57. See, e.g., S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 61 (1985) 
(viewing state action as a balance of the federal interest in advancing competition and the state interest 
in regulating competition); New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 110-11 (1978) 
(same); City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 398-400 (1978) (same). 
Commentators have also widely seen state action as achieving an accommodation of the two 
conflicting interests. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & 
ECON. 23, 24-25 (1983); Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust and the New State Action Doctrine: A Return to 
Deferential Economic Federalism, 75 CAL. L. REV. 227, 227-29 (1987); David McGowen & Mark A. 
Lemley, Antitrust Immunity: State Action and Federalism, Petitioning and the First Amendment, 17 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 293, 298-301 (1994); John Shephard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of 
Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 713-15, 729-39 (1986). But see Einer Richard Elhauge, 
The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 HARV. L. REV. 667, 673-96 (1991) (rejecting the “conflict and 
accommodation” paradigm and arguing instead that state action cases can be best explained under the 
“process” paradigm) [hereinafter Antitrust Process]. 
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doctrine began with the seminal case of Parker v. Brown
58
 involving a 
California statute that essentially established a program that fixed raisin 
prices and restricted competition among raisin growers.
59
 Aiming to promote 
the values of federalism and state sovereignty, the Supreme Court held that 
state officials enforcing the raisin program were immune from antitrust 
liability because the Sherman Act was not intended to restrain “state 
action.”60 Because Parker was brought against only the state administrators 
of the program, not the private growers who either orchestrated or complied 
with it, the case does not decide under what circumstances, if any, private 
parties acting under warrant of state law are also exempt. 
In a series of subsequent cases, the immunity from antitrust liability 
accorded state officials in Parker was extended to private parties whose 
anticompetitive acts were the product of state action.
61
 The doctrine 
gradually evolved into three formal rules. If courts consider the 
anticompetitive restraint in question a direct act of “the State as sovereign,”62 
the restraint enjoys absolute immunity from antitrust review.
63
 However, if 
courts consider the actor private, then, under a test articulated in California 
Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
64
 immunity 
exists only if the challenged restraint was taken pursuant to a “clearly 
articulated and affirmatively expressed . . . state policy,”65 and was subject to 
 
 
 58. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
 59. The Act was passed during the Depression in the 1930s. According to the preamble to the 
Act, there was an overproduction of raisins, resulting in “the unreasonable waste of [the state’s] 
agricultural wealth.” 1933 Cal. Stat. 754, § 1. The Act established a program, backed by the state’s 
enforcement authority, that essentially allowed raisin producers to control output and fix prices of 
raisins. Parker, 317 U.S. at 346. 
 60. Id. at 351 (“The Sherman Act makes no mention of the state as such, and gives no hint that it 
was intended to restrain state action or official action directed by a state.”). 
 61. See infra notes 62-70. 
 62. La. Power & Light, 435 U.S. at 410. A direct act of the state as sovereign generally includes 
acts of the state legislature, the highest state court acting in its legislative capacity, and possibly the 
governor. See Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567-69 (1984); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 
350, 359-60 (1977); Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-51. 
 63. See, e.g., S. Motor Carriers, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 64 (1985); Cmty. 
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 50-54 (1982); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 
U.S. 773, 790-91 (1975). 
 64. 445 U.S. 97 (1980). 
 65. Id. at 105 (quoting La. Power & Light, 435 U.S. at 410). See also Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 
94, 100 (1988). To satisfy the clear authorization requirement, it is unnecessary to show that state law 
compelled the challenged actions. See S. Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 60-61; Town of Hallie v. City of 
Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 43 (1985). The actor only needs to show that the legislature or state supreme 
court contemplated the type of activity that is being challenged. Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 42. 
However, it should be noted that “mere [state] neutrality respecting the . . . actions challenged as 
anticompetitive” will not satisfy this first requirement. Cmty. Communications, 455 U.S. at 55 
(emphasis omitted). 
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active state supervision.
66
 A third, intermediate rule governs acts of 
municipalities, state agencies, and other subordinate state entities. Under this 
rule, these lower-level state entities are not deemed “the state” for purposes 
of the state action doctrine
67
 and must show state authorization to enjoy state 
action immunity.
68
 However, unlike private actors, subordinate state entities 
do not have to show active state supervision of their actions.
69
 
The additional demands in cases where the sovereign state is not deemed 
to be the actor seem to be based on the view that federal antitrust law should 
give way to state regulatory decisions only if the state actually imposes a 
regulatory scheme that it believes would serve the state’s interests more 
effectively than free competition.
70
 However, if the state does not clearly 
indicate its regulatory intentions or if the state does not appear to be taking its 
own policy seriously (by failing to actively monitor it),
71
 then the rationale 
 
 
 66. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminium, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1980) 
(citing La. Power & Light, 435 U.S. at 410). See also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 
U.S. 621, 635 (1992); S. Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 58-59; Patrick, 486 U.S. at 100. The active state 
supervision requirement is not satisfied when the state “simply authorizes price setting and enforces 
the prices established by private parties” because this broad authorization merely “cast[s] . . . a gauzy 
cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement.” 324 Liquor 
Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1987) (quoting Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105). 
 67. See La. Power & Light, 435 U.S. at 408-17; Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 38-40; Hoover, 466 
U.S. at 568-69; Cmty. Communications, 455 U.S. at 50-54. 
 68. See S. Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 60-61, 62-63; Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 38-40; Cmty. 
Communications, 455 U.S. at 51-52. It should be noted, however, that it does not take much for 
municipalities to meet this clear authorization requirement. Municipalities only need to show that the 
state as sovereign demonstrated an intention “to displace competition in a particular field with a 
regulatory structure.” S. Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 64. In fact, antitrust courts have found clear state 
authorization for agency action even when the state supreme court specifically found that the 
challenged action was not authorized by state law, and even when evidence showed that state officials 
abused their authority. See Lease Lights, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Co., 849 F.2d 1330, 1333-35 (10th Cir. 
1988); Llewellyn v. Crothers, 765 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 69. See Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 46-47, 47 n.10 (concluding that municipal actors need not 
show active state supervision, and suggesting—though not deciding—that state agency actors also 
need not show active state supervision); Hass v. Or. State Bar, 883 F.2d 1453, 1457-63 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(viewing state bar association as a state agency requiring clear state authorization for a restraint, but 
not active state supervision). Municipalities (and probably state agencies) need not show active state 
supervision because they are considered less likely than private actors to pursue private interests in 
imposing regulation. Hass, 883 F.2d at 1459. 
 70. See Cmty. Communications, 455 U.S. at 55 (holding that the state must clearly articulate and 
affirmatively express a state policy of replacing competition with regulation and that municipalities are 
not simply free “to do as they please”); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) (pointing out that 
state action doctrine does not permit the state to “give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act 
by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful”); Merrick B. Garland, 
Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Political Process, 96 YALE L.J. 486, 500 
(1987) (defending the Midcal two-prong test as a sensible federalism compromise that does not permit 
delegation of unsupervised power to restrain trade, which would effectively allow states to nullify the 
Sherman Act). 
 71. The active state supervision requirement stems from fears that private actors may act to 
further their own self-interests, rather than state policies, and it serves to ensure that the state exercise 
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for immunity disappears.
72
 Thus, if the state chooses to delegate its authority 
to regulate, the law requires some demonstration that the state clearly 
authorized the restraint and, in the case of private actors, also actively 
supervised the conduct before antitrust immunity is deemed warranted. 
The state action doctrine has been widely criticized for “spawn[ing] more 
confusion and litigation than certainty”73 and for its lack of a coherent 
theory.
74
 No clear theoretical principles exist to aid in the determination of 
which actor bears responsibility for the restraint,
75
 when a restraint is 
considered an act of the state,
76
 how much supervision suffices for the active 
state supervision requirement, who needs supervision, who can supervise on 
the state’s behalf, and so forth.77 Critics also lament the absence of an 
acceptable doctrinal explanation for most judicial decisions as to whether a 
particular case involves a state or private action.
78
 
In the context of restraints on competition involving state bar associations 
and boards or committees appointed by the states’ highest courts, the 
Supreme Court has found these entities’ activities to be private in one case79 
and to be acts of the state supreme court in two cases.
80
 In Goldfarb v. 
 
 
ultimate control over the imposed restraint on competition. See Patrick, 486 U.S. at 101. On the 
assumption that municipalities and state agencies are less likely to pursue private interests, rather than 
state policies, these lower-level state entities and subdivisions do not need to meet the active state 
supervision requirement. See Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 46-47. 
 72. See Ticor Title Ins., 504 U.S. at 636. See also Garland, supra note 70, at 501, 508 (noting 
that Midcal effectively immunizes true state action or “action taken by the state qua state,” but does 
not immunize conduct that is “effectively private action” or the delegation of competition-restraining 
power to private parties). 
 73. Antitrust Process, supra note 57, at 674. 
 74. See, e.g., id.; Daniel J. Gifford, Federalism, Efficiency, the Commerce Clause, and the 
Sherman Act: Why We Should Follow a Consistent Free-Market Policy, 44 EMORY L.J. 1227, 1229 n.5 
(1995) (noting that “case law exhibits a remarkable lack of coherence”); McGowan & Lemley, supra 
note 57, at 298 (remarking on the “confused state of the cases” and the “doctrinal confusion” caused 
by the Court’s state action interpretation); William H. Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory 
Process: A Reconstruction and Critique of the State Action Exemption After Midcal Aluminum, 61 
B.U. L. REV. 1099, 1109 (1981) (describing the current doctrine as “internally inconsistent”); John 
Shephard Wiley Jr., Revision and Apology in Antitrust Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1277, 1280 (1987) 
(criticizing the state action doctrine as “irrational antitrust policy”). 
 75. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 212.6, at 160 (Supp. 
1989) (commenting on the “pervasive vexatiousness” of the problem). 
 76. See id. ¶ 212.2c-d, at 127-31, ¶ 212.9f, at 184-87.  
 77. See id. ¶ 212.7, at 164-67. 
 78. See, e.g., Antitrust Process, supra note 55, at 685 (observing that the Court simply “ignored 
the clear state action . . . [and] made the conclusory assertion that these restraints were ‘private’ . . . 
and thus not immune without active state supervision”). 
 79. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
 80. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
See also Lawline v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 956 F.2d 1378 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that bar associations were 
immune from antitrust liability because the state supreme court had adopted the associations’ 
disciplinary rule prohibiting unauthorized practice of law). 
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Virginia State Bar,
81
 the earliest Supreme Court case dealing with state 
action in connection with the legal profession, the Court did not accord the 
Virginia State Bar state action immunity for its issuance of an ethical opinion 
requiring bar members to adhere to a minimum fee schedule.
82
 Although the 
Supreme Court acknowledged that the Virginia State Bar was “a state agency 
for some limited purposes,” it treated the bar as a private actor83 apparently 
because the Virginia Supreme Court had not compelled the fee schedule 
adoption.
84
  
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,
85
 in contrast, attributed an act of the State 
Bar of Arizona to the Arizona Supreme Court. The case involved an antitrust 
challenge to the state bar's enforcement of a disciplinary rule banning lawyer 
advertising.
86
 Finding that the Arizona Supreme Court was “the ultimate 
body wielding the State’s power over the practice of law”87 and that the 
disciplinary rule in question was an “affirmative command” of that court,88 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that the real actor was the Arizona Supreme 
Court and, therefore, state action immunity applied. 
 
 
 Lower courts have also treated state bar associations, committees, boards, and other entities 
appointed by a state supreme court as state agencies. See, e.g., Benton v. La. Pub. Facilities Auth., 897 
F.2d 198, 203-04 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that LPFA, a public corporation authorized by the state to 
issue bonds, operated as a state agency in selecting the bond counsel and, therefore, a showing of 
active state supervision was unnecessary for state action immunity); Hass v. Or. State Bar, 883 F.2d 
1453 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding that the state bar acted as a state agency in requiring all state 
attorneys to purchase malpractice insurance through the state bar, and therefore must show clear state 
authorization but not active state supervision); Guralnick v. Supreme Court of N.J., 747 F. Supp. 1109, 
1117-18 (D.N.J. 1990) (holding that the Fee Arbitration Committee appointed by the New Jersey 
Supreme Court acted as a state agency and, therefore, probably did not need to show active state 
supervision), aff’g 961 F.2d 209 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 81. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
 82. Although the minimum fee schedule was supposedly merely “advisory,” the state bar’s 
ethical opinion provided that the “consistent and intentional violation of the . . . minimum fee schedule 
for the purpose of increasing business can . . . constitute solicitation,” in violation of the Virginia bar 
disciplinary rules. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 497 F.2d 1, 4 (4th Cir. 1974), rev’d, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
 83. See Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791-92 (“The State Bar, by providing that deviation from County 
Bar minimum fees may lead to disciplinary action, has voluntarily joined in what is essentially a 
private anticompetitive activity, and in that posture cannot claim it is beyond the reach of the Sherman 
Act.”). See also Lender’s Serv., Inc. v. Dayton Bar Ass’n, 758 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Ohio 1991) 
(concluding that the state bar’s prosecution of an alleged violation of the Ohio Supreme Court rule 
banning the unauthorized practice of law cannot be considered an act of the Ohio Supreme Court, but 
the state bar’s action was nonetheless immunized because the state both clearly authorized and actively 
supervised the restraint). 
 84. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 790-91. 
 85. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
 86. Bates is mostly remembered for holding that bans on lawyer advertising violated the 
constitutional right to free speech. However, the case is also significant for its rejection of the 
plaintiff's antitrust claim on state action grounds. See id. at 359-62. 
 87. Id. at 360. 
 88. Id. at 359-60. 
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In another case where a state supreme court’s involvement seems even 
less direct, Hoover v. Ronwin,
89
 the Supreme Court likewise attributed the 
challenged conduct to the state supreme court, which was, therefore, entitled 
to per se immunity. Hoover involved an antitrust suit brought by a failing 
candidate of a state bar examination against the Committee on Examination 
and Admissions. The plaintiff argued that the committee had graded on a 
curve formulated to limit the number of passing examinations (and, hence, 
the number of new attorneys) in violation of the Sherman Act.
90
 In affirming 
the lower court’s dismissal of the complaint, the Court held that the 
challenged conduct “was in reality that of the Arizona Supreme Court,” 
which had appointed the committee and formally made all final bar 
admission decisions, and was therefore per se immune.
91
 However, as the 
dissent pointed out, the more realistic view of the situation Hoover v. Ronwin 
presented is that the state supreme court left real control of the examination 
and bar admissions process to the committee, composed of practicing 
lawyers, and rarely exercised its formal powers.
92
 Given this reality, the 
Court’s holding that the committee acted as “the state,” and not merely as a 
subordinate state agency, is somewhat puzzling.
93
 
 
 
 89. 466 U.S. 558 (1984). 
 90. Id. at 564-65, 570 & n.19. 
 91. Id. at 573. The Court gave the following reasons for its conclusion that the state was the real 
actor: The committee filed its grading formula with the state supreme court prior to the examination; 
the state supreme court had considered and rejected the plaintiff’s challenge to the grading formula; 
and the state supreme court made the final decisions on admission of bar applicants. Id. at 572-73, 
576-78. Thus, even if the committee members had decided to grade more strictly in order to reduce the 
total number of new lawyers admitted to practice, the state supreme court would have been aware of it. 
Id. at 576 n.28. 
 92. Id. at 588-89, 589 n.12, 592 n.16 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 93. In an effort to harmonize the seemingly ad hoc judicial resolutions regarding when an actor 
in a case is deemed to be the state, Professor Einer Elhauge has persuasively argued that the true 
dispositive issue in each case, and the normative approach to the doctrine, is whether “the person 
controlling the terms of the restraint” is financially interested. Antitrust Process, supra note 57, at 685. 
Einer Elhauge suggests that, because financially interested parties cannot be trusted to promote the 
public interest, the Court, in fact, applies state action immunity only when financially disinterested 
state officials control the terms of the restraint in question. Id. at 683-96. Thus, when the state 
delegates its decision making function to private parties, the person controlling the terms of the 
restraint is financially interested. Therefore, courts are unwilling to grant state action immunity unless 
that the state clearly authorized the restraint and actively supervised it (i.e., unless a financially 
disinterested party was ultimately in charge of the decision making process). Viewed from this 
paradigm, the Courts’ seemingly inconsistent decisions as to whether the actor in a case is deemed the 
state can be better understood. 
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2. Petitioning Immunity
94
 
In Parker, the case from which the state action doctrine was derived, the 
Court implied that if state action (regardless of the degree of its 
anticompetitiveness) is immune from antitrust liability, petitioning the state 
for that restraint cannot be punished.
95
 This implication was made explicit in 
Eastern Railroad President’s Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,96 a 
case involving a publicity campaign conducted by a group of railroads 
against truckers. The campaign, which included fraudulent and disparaging 
statements about truckers, produced two effects: it persuaded the state to pass 
legislation impeding truckers’ ability to compete with the railroads,97 and it 
also directly impaired truckers’ good will with their customers.98 
The Supreme Court had little trouble finding that the first effect did not 
subject the railroads to antitrust liability.
99
 It stated simply that “the Sherman 
Act does not prohibit two or more persons from associating together in an 
attempt to persuade the legislature or the executive to take particular action 
with respect to a law that would produce a restraint or monopoly.”100 
Antitrust immunity for joint efforts to influence government officials would 
seem to be a corollary of state action, given the value of the right to petition 
in a democracy.
101
 As to the more difficult question concerning the second 
effect, the Court concluded that petitioning immunity should extend to that 
effect as well because it was incidental to legitimate attempts to influence 
government action.
102
 
 
 
 94. The petitioning immunity doctrine is often referred to as the Noerr doctrine or the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine. However, like a growing number of commentators, I will not refer to it by that 
term because the doctrine today raises many more complex issues than were presented in E. R.R. 
President’s Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), or in United Mine Workers 
v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). Furthermore, subsequent case law has eclipsed some of the 
significance of these two early cases. 
 95. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-52. 
 96. 365 U.S. 127 (1961). 
 97. Id. at 129-30. 
 98. Id. at 129, 133, 142. 
 99. Id. at 136.  
 100. Id. at 136-38. See also Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. at 508, 510-
11 (1971); Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670. 
 101. See E. R.R. President’s Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137 (1961) 
(noting that “the whole concept of representation depends on the ability of the people to make their 
wishes known to their representatives,” and that the Court cannot penalize citizens for making 
demands of the government when the government is expected to be responsive to their needs).  
 102. Id. at 142-44. It did not address, however, what effects would be deemed “incidental” to the 
petitioning. For example, does the effect have to be small relative to the political effect to be 
incidental? Or is the effect considered incidental whenever it is related to the petitioning activities? Or 
is it incidental only if it is necessary for petitioning? The Court did make clear, however, that it does 
not matter whether the individuals that sought a government restraint were motivated by a financial 
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As with state action, petitioning immunity suffers from a lack of doctrinal 
coherence.
103
 Commentators have criticized the doctrine’s lack of “clear 
moorings,”104 its inconsistency,105 and the uncertainty as to whether the 
doctrine is based on a statutory interpretation of the antitrust laws or on the 
First Amendment right to petition.
106
 Although some of the doctrinal muddle 
in earlier petitioning cases was resolved in Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. 
Indian Head, Inc.
107
 (and other recent cases),
108
 that decision has created new 
sources of confusion, and its implications on standard setting, which includes 
 
 
interest or whether the lobbying methods employed were unethical or deceptive. Id. at 139-42. 
 103. The sweeping principle articulated in Noerr—that joint efforts to influence the government 
do not violate the antitrust laws, even though intended to eliminate competition—was marked with 
conflicting and confusing exceptions, especially in the earlier years of the development of the doctrine. 
For example, there is the “sham” exception, which was stretched to cover improper petitioning 
activities even if these activities were intended to and did influence government action. A 
“commercial” exception to the doctrine was also unclear and poorly defined, as was the conspiracy 
exception. See generally Stephen Calkins, Development in Antitrust and the First Amendment: The 
Disaggregation of Noerr, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 327 (1988) (discussing these exceptions and other 
ambiguities); Gary Minda, Interest Groups, Political Freedoms, and Antitrust: A Modern 
Reassessment of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 905 (1990) (critiquing the 
incoherence of the Noerr doctrine). The sham exception has since been narrowed so that only activities 
not genuinely intended to gain government action would be considered sham. See Allied Tube & 
Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 502-03 (1988). For further discussion of Allied 
Tube, see infra notes 109-25 and accompanying text. 
 104. Einer Elhauge, Making Sense of Antitrust Petitioning Immunity, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1177, 1191 
(1992). 
 105. See Calkins, supra note 103, at 338-39; McGowan & Lemley, supra note 57, at 363-64. 
 106. The cases seem to say that the doctrine is based on statutory interpretation, but is influenced 
by an appreciation of the First Amendment right to petition. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Superior 
Court Trial Lawyers’ Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 424 (1989) (seeing the doctrine as “[i]nterpreting the 
Sherman Act in light of the First Amendment’s Petition Clause”); Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking 
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-11 (1971) (taking a more constitutional approach by noting that the 
failure to recognize petitioning immunity “would be destructive of rights of association and petition”); 
Pennington, 381 U.S. at 669 (stating that “[t]he Sherman Act . . . was not intended to bar concerted 
action of this kind”); Noerr, 365 U.S. at 138 (casting its decision as based on statutory interpretation, 
but noting that a ruling otherwise “would raise important constitutional questions”). For commentary 
supporting a statutory interpretation approach, see Milton Handler & Richard A. De Sevo, The Noerr 
Doctrine and Its Sham Exception, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1984). For arguments supporting a First 
Amendment analysis, see Daniel Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence Government 
Action: The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 80, 80-84, 94-96 
(1977); Garland, supra note 70, at 512-16; James D. Hurwitz, Abuse of Governmental Processes, the 
First Amendment, and the Boundaries of Noerr, 74 GEO. L.J. 65, 66 (1985); McGowan & Lemley, 
supra note 57, at 361-70. 
 107. 486 U.S. 492 (1988). The case sharply restricted the sham exception to petitioning immunity. 
It now applies only to activities not genuinely intended to influence government action. Real efforts to 
petition the government, no matter how improper and abusive, are no longer considered sham. Id. at 
502, 507 n.10. 
 108. See, e.g., City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver. 499 U.S. 365, 374-84 (1991) 
(overturning a jury verdict that found a conspiracy between a private competitor and municipal 
officials on the ground that there is no conspiracy exception to either state action or petitioning 
immunity, except possibly when the government acts as a market participant). 
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accreditation, are particularly unclear. 
Allied Tube involved a widespread practice of trade association members 
promulgating standards that were later adopted by state and municipal 
governments. The plaintiff alleged that Allied Tube, a steel conduit maker, 
stacked a meeting of a highly respected private standard setting association 
with its own agents in order to defeat the inclusion of a competitor’s plastic 
conduit in the association’s electrical code.109 The defendant’s activities 
allegedly had two effects. First, numerous state and local governments 
eventually adopted the code, which effectively banned the use of plastic 
conduit in those areas.
110
 Second, the exclusion of plastic conduit from the 
code stigmatized the product, even where the code was not incorporated into 
law, which was a harm separate from the states’ adoption of the code.111 In 
an antitrust action brought by the plastic conduit maker seeking damages for 
the second effect,
112
 Allied Tube asserted petitioning immunity as a defense. 
The question, therefore, was whether Allied Tube’s petitions to the private 
standard-setting association should be immunized from antitrust liability with 
respect to the stigma effect. 
The Court’s decision was complex. It first reaffirmed and elaborated on 
the difference, drawn in Noerr, between harm caused by the requested state 
action and harm resulting from “private action.”113 Where a restraint is the 
result of state action, those urging the action are absolutely immune;
114
 but 
where a restraint results from private action, there is immunity only if the 
restraint is “incidental” to valid efforts to influence the government, with 
“validity” depending on the “context and nature” of the activities.115 The case 
further held that petitions to a private organization might still enjoy 
 
 
 109. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 495-96. Allied Tube’s methods were subversive of the standard-
setting process. Allied Tube recruited (and financed) 230 new members specifically for the purposes of 
voting at the critical meeting. Id. at 496-97. The new members were rounded up for the vote and even 
“instructed where to sit and how and when to vote” by Allied Tube group leaders “who used walkie-
talkies and hand signals to facilitate communication” during the critical meeting. Id. at 497. Allied 
Tube eventually won on a very close vote of 390 to 394. Id. 
 110. See id. at 495-96. 
 111. For example, many underwriters refused to insure buildings not constructed in conformity to 
the code, and many contractors would not use unapproved products, even if the relevant local 
government had not adopted the code. Id. at 496. 
 112. The issue of damages for direct harm caused by state action (i.e., the enactment of the code in 
many states and municipalities) was not before the Court, either because the plaintiff never sought 
those damages or was not awarded these damages and chose not to appeal. However, the Court 
implied that injury from the enactment of the code would not be recoverable because of state action 
immunity. Id. at 500-01. 
 113. Id. at 499.  
 114. Id. (citing E. R.R. President’s Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136 
(1961)). 
 115. Id. (citing Noerr, 365 U.S. at 143). 
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petitioning immunity if the petition was a “valid effort to influence 
government action,”116 again with validity depending on “the context and 
nature” of the private actor’s activities.117 
Applying this standard, the Court said the private standard-setting 
association was not a “quasi-legislative” body simply because the states 
routinely adopted its work product.
118
 Thus, to enjoy petitioning immunity, 
the defendant’s efforts to affect the association vote must be “incidental” to 
“valid” attempts to influence government action.119 While the Court 
conceded that the defendant’s activities were incidental to genuine efforts to 
indirectly influence state and local governments,
120
 it said that the efforts 
were not “valid.”121 Thus, harm flowing from the defendant’s efforts to 
influence the private association (thereby indirectly influencing government 
action) did not enjoy immunity.
122
 Although it is not entirely clear from the 
decision, the “context and nature” that made the defendant’s petitioning 
efforts invalid seemed to have been the defendant’s subversion of the 
standard-setting process.
123
 The Court also ended with a broad holding: 
“[W]here, as here, an economically interested party exercises decision 
making authority in formulating a product standard for a private association 
that comprises market participants, that party enjoys no Noerr liability from 
any antitrust liability flowing from the effect the standard has of its own force 
in the marketplace.”124 
Given the vagueness of the decision, the implications of this case for 
standard setting (which includes accreditation) are uncertain.
125
 If the 
 
 
 116. Id. at 502. 
 117. Id. at 504. 
 118. Id. at 501. 
 119. See id. at 499 (citing Noerr, 365 U.S. at 143) (noting that an “anticompetitive restraint 
result[ing] directly from private action . . . cannot form the basis for antitrust liability if it is 
‘incidental’ to a valid effort to influence governmental action”).  
 120. Id. at 503. The Court rejected earlier interpretations of the “sham” exception that covered any 
form of improper petitioning, and specifically said that the defendant’s activities were not “sham” 
because they were obviously aimed at influencing government action. Id. at 502. The Court also 
rejected the argument that petitioning immunity can apply only to direct petitioning of government 
officials, noting that petitioning a private standard setting organization may sometimes be the only 
effective way to influence government action. Id. at 503. 
 121. Id. at 503-10. 
 122. Id. at 509-10. 
 123. Id. at 504 (noting the defendant’s “rounding up economically interested persons to set private 
standards”). 
 124. Id. at 509-10. 
 125. In dissent, Justice White, joined by Justice O’Connor, said: 
[C]onduct otherwise punishable under the antitrust laws either becomes immune from the 
operation of those laws when it is part of a larger design to influence the passage and enforcement 
of laws, or it does not. No workable boundaries to the Noerr doctrine are established by declaring, 
and then repeating at every turn, that everything depends on ‘the context and nature of’ the activity 
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expansive holding applies, few participants in standard-setting organizations 
will ever have immunity for the effects of those standards on the marketplace 
(i.e., effects other than those that flow from their adoption into law) because 
most standard-setting organizations are composed of interested market 
participants. If, however, the narrower holding applies, the tactics that are 
used will, instead, be the determinative factor, and an interested participant 
who has not engaged in improper methods of persuasion might still enjoy 
immunity. 
B. Application of Immunity Doctrines to Law School Accreditation
126
 
Applying these immunity doctrines to law school accreditation proves 
more complicated than usual for several reasons. First, accreditation, unlike 
most state action and petitioning immunity situations, includes an additional 
restraint that precedes, and is separable from, state action and petitioning.
127
 
An accrediting body must first agree on the standards to be used in making 
accreditation decisions and then apply those standards accordingly. Even if 
state action fails or does not follow, the accreditation standards continue to be 
used in making accreditation determinations. Second, state action is usually 
limited to the official adoption of the accreditation results. The state rarely, if 
ever, endorses the criteria used to reach those results. Thus, it remains 
unclear whether state action immunity extends to the standards as well, 
assuming the doctrine’s applicability to the states’ use of accreditation 
decisions in bar admissions. Third, there is usually no current petitioning of 
 
 
. . . if we are unable to offer any further guidance about what this vague reference is supposed to 
mean, especially when the result here is so clearly wrong as long as Noerr itself is reputed to 
remain good law. . . . [Lower courts] will be obliged to puzzle over claims raised under the 
doctrine without any intelligible guidance about when and why to apply it.  
Id. at 513 (White, J., dissenting). 
 126. Because the United States Department of Education recognizes the ABA as the sole 
accrediting body for American law schools, and attendance at an ABA-accredited school entitles 
students to federal financial assistance, some might argue that the ABA enjoys federal antitrust 
immunity from the antitrust law. This argument should not succeed because there is no explicit 
immunity granted under the congressional act authorizing the Department of Education to designate 
accrediting agencies. See 20 U.S.C. § 1099b (1994). And, the Supreme Court has long disfavored 
implicit exemptions from the Sherman Act, noting that “‘[i]mplied antitrust immunity . . . can be 
justified only by a convincing showing of clear repugnancy between the antitrust laws and the 
regulatory system.’” Nat’l Gerimedical Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378, 388 (1981) (quoting United 
States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 719-20 (1975)). There is no such repugnancy 
between the Department of Education’s regulation of the ABA accreditation system and the antitrust 
laws. The Department’s regulations focus on accrediting activities, and make certain disclosures 
mandatory. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 602.14-26 (2000). The regulations do not compel or even facilitate 
violation of the antitrust laws. 
 127. A preexisting restraint, independent of state action, also exists where trade associations set 
standards that the state later adopts, such as in Allied Tube. 
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the state: the successful petitioning typically occurs long before the particular 
accreditation decisions.
128
 Therefore, petitioning immunity, which might 
have been applicable when efforts were first made to secure state backing, 
may not have any application today, long after the successful petitioning. 
These complicating factors have not drawn much notice: of the few cases 
dealing with antitrust claims in the accreditation context,
129
 only 
Massachusetts School of Law at Andover, Inc. v. American Bar 
Association,
130
 has even briefly noted them.
131
  
1. Exclusionary Effect of States’ Use of Accreditation Decisions Is 
Immune Under State Action 
The first anticompetitive effect of ABA accreditation flows from the 
state’s effective adoption of the ABA’s accreditation results (by excluding 
graduates of non ABA-approved schools from the bar examination). This 
exclusionary effect will be ipso facto immune from antitrust review if the bar 
admission rule effectuating the exclusion can be considered an act of the state 
itself, a conclusion that Hoover v. Ronwin
132
 seems to compel. The plaintiff 
in Hoover, who attributed his bar examination failure to the use of a grading 
 
 
 128. For example, the ABA petitioned the states decades ago to allow only graduates from ABA-
approved schools to take the bar examination, and had largely succeeded in its campaign by 1958. 
STEVENS, supra note 1, at 207-08. Since then, the ABA merely conveys its list of accredited law 
schools to the states annually, along with a copy of its accreditation standards. See supra note 32 and 
accompanying text. The ABA’s current activity—that of merely communicating its accreditation 
results to the states—may not qualify as petitioning. The actual petitioning associated with ABA 
accreditation took place prior to the accreditation decisions. 
 129. See Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 107 F.3d 1026 (3d Cir. 1997); 
Feldman v. Gardner, 661 F.2d 1295, 1304-08 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia was entitled to state action immunity for requiring graduation from an ABA-
accredited school as a condition for bar admission); Brandt v. Am. Bar Ass'n, No. CIV.A.3:96-CV-
2606D, 1997 WL 279762, at *1-2 (N.D. Tex. May 15, 1997) (dismissing accreditation-related suit 
against the ABA on petitioning immunity ground); Zavaletta v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 721 F. Supp. 96 (E.D. 
Va. 1989) (denying plaintiffs’ request for an injunction compelling the ABA to grant accredition to 
plaintiffs’ school on the ground that the ABA merely expressed a First Amendment protected opinion 
and did not restrain trade); Sherman College of Straight Chiropractic v. Am. Chiropractic Ass’n, 654 
F. Supp. 716 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (holding that chiropractic board of examiners enjoyed petitioning 
immunity for their lobbying activities with state licensing boards), aff’d, 813 F.2d 349 (11th Cir. 
1987). 
 130. 107 F.3d 1026 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 131. See id. at 1038 (noting that while the ABA’s petitioning activities occurred before the 1970s, 
its current conduct in communicating accreditation decisions to the states and “[d]iscussing the quality 
and competence of its decisions” also constituted petitioning); id. at 1038-39 (concluding that 
unaccredited school showed no antitrust injury from the ABA’s enforcement of its accreditation 
standards, but stating that “the ABA is not immune in the actual enforcement of its standards” because 
“the state action relates to the use of the results of the accreditation process, not the process itself”). 
 132. 466 U.S. 558 (1984). 
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formula allegedly designed to limit the number of passing applicants, sued 
the Committee on Examinations and Admissions (the “Committee”) that had 
set the “curve” and graded the examinations.133 While the Committee, 
comprising attorneys appointed by the Arizona Supreme Court, administered 
the bar examination and bar admissions process, final authority to admit or 
deny applications for admission to the bar rested with the Arizona Supreme 
Court.
134
 In affirming the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim, the U.S. Supreme 
Court attributed the Committee’s grading formula to the Arizona Supreme 
Court,
135
 which acts as the state, and thus held the Committee per se 
immune.
136
 
Similarly, the Third Circuit in Massachuetts School of Law found that the 
states acted as sovereign when they promulgated bar admission eligibility 
rules.
137
 Noting that every state regulates admission to the practice of law in 
its own state,
138
 the court of appeals held that the unaccredited law school’s 
injuries were the effects of state action because they resulted from its 
students’ inability to sit for the bar examination in most states.139 Thus, the 
ABA enjoyed state action immunity without needing to make any further 
showing of clear state authorization or active supervision.
140
 
This conclusion seems proper despite the fact that there is effectively 
some functional delegation of authority to the ABA: the ABA, through the 
accreditation decisions, essentially controls who will be affected by the bar 
examination rule. That is because the states remain the ultimate decision 
makers due to their ability to abandon their reliance on the ABA process at 
any time (by revising or eliminating the bar examination exclusion rule). 
Indeed, a contrary conclusion would be hard to justify under Bates,
141
 which 
held that a state bar association’s enforcement of a disciplinary rule that had 
been proposed by a private bar constituted an act of state because the state 
supreme court ultimately promulgated the rule.
142
 A different conclusion 
would probably also be inconsistent with Hoover,
143
 which attributed the 
grading methods of a committee appointed by a state supreme court to the 
 
 
 133. Id. at 564-65.  
 134. Id. at 561-64. 
 135. Id. at 569-73. 
 136. Id. at 573. 
 137. Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 107 F.3d 1026, 1036 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 138. See id. at 1035. 
 139. Id. at 1036.  
 140. Id.  
 141. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
 142. Id. at 362-63.  
 143. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984). 
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court itself, despite the fact that the state supreme court obviously played, at 
most, a minor role in the derivation of the challenged grading formula.
144
 
2. Stigma Effect Enjoys No Petitioning Immunity  
In addition to the exclusionary effect caused by state adoption of ABA 
accreditation decisions, another potentially anticompetitive effect resulting 
from the ABA’s accreditation activities is the stigma that attaches to 
unaccredited law schools as a result of their unapproved status, which hinders 
their ability to compete on the merits. This second effect does not implicate 
the state action doctrine because the effect exists independently of the 
restraint imposed by the state bar eligibility rules. However, under Noerr,
145
 
petitioning immunity protects this effect if it is incidental to legitimate 
petitioning activities.
146
 In other words, as long as there is valid petitioning of 
the state, petitioning immunity extends, not only to the anticompetitive 
effects of the state action that may result from petitioning, but also to the 
incidental anticompetitive effects on the marketplace. 
In the context of ABA accreditation, if the ABA has legitimately lobbied 
the states to adopt restrictive bar examination eligibility rules, any stigma 
harm (i.e., nonstate-action injury) caused by the petitioning will probably be 
considered incidental to the lobbying efforts and therefore immunized. Given 
that most states require graduation from an ABA-accredited law school as a 
condition for taking the bar, the exclusionary effect of the states’ rules (i.e., 
state action) must be significantly greater than the stigma injury inflicted on 
the unaccredited schools. Moreover, an explanation of why the ABA 
considers its seal of approval the only reliable signal of law school quality 
would logically be an integral part of the ABA’s case to the states for 
acceptance of its accreditation decisions. Furthermore, unlike in Allied Tube, 
nothing in the “context and nature” of the ABA’s petitioning can be 
construed as invalid.
147
 
However, if the ABA has not engaged in any activities to influence the 
state, there has been no petitioning to which a stigma effect can be incidental. 
Therefore, there can be no possible petitioning immunity for such a stigma 
effect. In the early to mid-1900s, the ABA unquestionably engaged in valid 
petitioning by waging a state-by-state campaign to secure the restrictive bar 
 
 
 144. Id. at 569-74.  
 145. E. R.R. President’s Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). 
 146. See id. at 143-44. 
 147. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 499-511 (1988). 
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admission eligibility rules that currently exist in most states.
148
 Under Noerr, 
the anticompetitive effect of the state bar admission rules passed as a result of 
that successful campaign has immunity.
149
 Furthermore, if the petitioning 
also resulted in incidental stigma injury, the stigma effect most likely has 
antitrust immunity as well. 
The open question, however, is whether resting on one’s laurels and 
relying on prior successful petitioning can be considered current petitioning 
so as to immunize stigma injury inflicted long after the initial petitioning 
campaign. In other words, does the ABA’s current practice of merely 
sending to the states its list of accredited schools and a copy of its 
accreditation standards
150
 constitute petitioning activity sufficient to invoke 
petitioning immunity for any incidental stigma injury that might flow from 
the denial of accreditation? I argue that it does not. And if there is no 
petitioning to which the stigma can be incidental, then, under Noerr, there 
cannot be petitioning immunity for the stigma effect.
151
  
3. Restraint of ABA Accreditation Standards 
Accreditation and general standard-setting cases further complicate the 
already difficult application of state action and petitioning immunity 
doctrines. First, these cases inevitably include standards that exist whether or 
not state action follows. Second, even when states adopt the accreditation 
decisions, they typically do not expressly adopt the standards applied in 
reaching those decisions.
152
 Third, even if accreditation and standard-setting 
entities petition the states to adopt the accreditation decisions, there is usually 
little, if any, attempt to influence the states regarding the standards 
themselves.
153
  
 
 
 148. See generally STEVENS, supra note 1, at 93-321 (discussing the ABA attempts to restrict 
entry into the legal profession).  
 149. See E. R.R. President’s Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 143-44 
(1961).  
 150. See Mass. Sch. of Law, 107 F.3d at 1030.  
 151. See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 143-44.  
 152. In standard-setting cases not involving accreditation, such as Allied Tube, standards are 
typically embodied in the codes submitted to the states for enactment into law. See, e.g., id. at 495-96. 
To the extent that the code includes an enumeration of the standards, the state, by adopting the code, 
has technically adopted each standard therein. As a practical matter, however, when states enact a code 
consisting of numerous (and usually highly technical) standards relating to a specific industry, they do 
not actually consider the substantive merits of each standard and decide to adopt each into law. 
Therefore, in this respect, no substantive difference exists between accreditation and other standard-
setting programs. 
 153. Similarly, in presenting a code of standards to the states for adoption, a private standard-
setting organization has technically petitioned the state with respect to each of the standards. However, 
in truth, a private standard-setting organization, much like an accrediting body, does not generally 
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In other kinds of cases, this overlay of standards, independent of the 
ensuing state action and petitioning, does not exist. For example, if a group 
of raisin producers petitions the state legislature to set minimum raisin prices 
and the legislature obliges by passing a statute that fixes the prices as 
requested, price fixing is clearly the only restraint. As a result, the price 
fixing legislation is protected as state action, and the raisin growers’ 
“compliance” with the fixed prices enjoys state action immunity. The 
growers’ petitioning activities, including their discussions regarding optimal 
price levels and their efforts to win favorable legislative action, will also be 
protected under petitioning immunity. If the attempt to obtain government 
action fails, things return to the way they were before the campaign (i.e., no 
fixed prices), but the growers’ petitioning activities still receive petitioning 
immunity.
154
 However, any agreement among the growers to maintain the 
prices and other restraints discussed in connection with their lobbying efforts, 
even in the absence of state action, would not constitute protected petitioning 
activities.
155
 
In the ABA accreditation context, the government restraint requested 
involves excluding (or disadvantaging) unaccredited institutions.
156
 The 
ABA asks the states to limit bar examination eligibility to graduates of ABA-
approved schools. If the states agree, as most do, the states’ restrictive bar 
examination rule effectuating the ABA’s accreditation decisions constitutes 
state action. But the states do not actually incorporate the standards the ABA 
used in reaching its accreditation decisions. And, even assuming that the 
ABA actually petitions the states to adopt its accreditation decisions, it seems 
highly unlikely that the discussion would extend to the merits of the 
substantive standards employed to reach those decisions. Furthermore, even 
 
 
spend time persuading the state to adopt each standard included in the code. Instead, the organization 
urges the state to adopt the code in its entirety on the basis of the association’s general reputation. 
Thus, little real difference exists between accreditation and nonaccreditation standard setting in this 
respect. 
 154. The existence of petitioning immunity does not depend on the presence of state action 
immunity. In other words, even if no state action follows (because the state is unpersuaded by the 
petitioning) or state action fails (perhaps because the restraint is not deemed an act of the state as 
sovereign and is otherwise insufficiently authorized or supervised to qualify for state action), the 
defendant’s right to petition the government remains protected and the defendant enjoys petitioning 
immunity. See Video Int’l. Prod. v. Warner-Amex Cable Communications, Inc., 858 F.2d 1075, 1083 
(5th Cir. 1988) (describing the purpose of Noerr as protecting the private party making the petition 
regardless of whether the government agency acted appropriately in passing the legislation). 
 155. The raisin growers’ agreement would simply be a price-fixing agreement. While the right to 
petition encompasses the right to agree on the contents of a request made of the government, that right 
obviously does not extend to agreements to collectively and privately adhere to those restraints if the 
petitioning fails. 
 156. In standard-setting cases not involving accreditation, the state is asked to exclude unapproved 
products. See, e.g., Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 495-97. 
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if some states choose not to give effect to the ABA accreditation decisions, 
the standards remain. Thus, the question arises whether the restraint of the 
standards will be shielded by state action or petitioning immunity, assuming 
that those doctrines do protect the restraint relating to the accreditation 
decisions. In other words, can the ABA be sued on the theory that one or 
more of its accreditation standards has an anticompetitive effect if it enjoys 
state action or petitioning immunity for the exclusionary effect flowing from 
the state use of its accreditation decisions? I argue that it can. 
In the only case that has addressed this issue, Massachusetts School of 
Law, the Third Circuit said that “[a]lthough the ABA is immune from 
liability attributable to the state action in requiring applicants for the bar 
examination to have graduated from an ABA-accredited law school . . . 
under the Noerr petitioning doctrine, the ABA is not immune in the actual 
enforcement of its standards.”157 Although the court’s analysis of this issue 
was rather limited (because it found no antitrust injury to the plaintiff), the 
opinion noted that to rule otherwise “would run counter to Allied Tube.”158 
Although I agree with the conclusion that neither immunity doctrine 
should extend to the anticompetitive effects resulting from the ABA’s 
promulgation and enforcement of its accreditation standards, I question the 
Third Circuit’s reliance on Allied Tube. The circumstances involved in Allied 
Tube cannot easily be analogized to the ABA’s situation. In Allied Tube, the 
court assessed the question whether and under what circumstances the 
participants in a private standard-setting process should enjoy petitioning 
immunity for the anticompetitive market effects of a standard that they 
persuaded a private organization to adopt, not whether the private standard 
setting organization itself was entitled to immunity for those effects.
159
 Had 
Allied Tube involved a standard-setting organization deciding, in the normal 
course of its activities, to exclude plastic conduit from its code, and the court 
had to determine whether the organization enjoyed petitioning immunity for 
the effects of the no-plastic standard, then the analogy would be more fitting. 
Stated differently, Allied Tube would be more applicable in a hypothetical 
case against a few accredited law schools that urged the ABA to promulgate, 
interpret, or enforce certain standards so as to deny accreditation to another 
law school than it would be in a case against the ABA alleging that its 
formulation and application of accreditation standards constituted a violation 
of the Sherman Act. 
 
 
 157. Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 107 F.3d 1026, 1038-39 (3d Cir. 
1997). 
 158. Id. at 1039. 
 159. Allied Tube did not address the issue of state action immunity. 
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Apart from the question of its applicability to ABA accreditation, Allied 
Tube has ambiguous implications in other respects. The Court denied the 
defendant petitioning immunity for the plaintiff’s stigma injury, holding that 
one’s attempt to influence a private organization receives immunity only if 
the anticompetitive effect is incidental to valid petitioning. In Allied Tube the 
defendant’s subversion of the standard-setting process presumably made the 
petitioning invalid.
160
 This suggests that participants in a private 
organization’s standard setting process who use less offensive tactics might 
still enjoy petitioning immunity. 
However, Allied Tube also broadly held “that at least where . . . an 
economically interested party exercises decisionmaking authority in 
formulating a product standard for a private association that comprises 
market participants, that party enjoys no Noerr immunity from any antitrust 
liability flowing from the effect the standard has of its own force in the 
marketplace.”161 Under a reasonable reading of this holding, if the ABA 
accrediting body is construed as comprising market participants, then no one 
involved in setting accreditation standards who is also considered an 
economically interested party will enjoy petitioning immunity for any 
anticompetitive effects ABA standards have on the marketplace (i.e., effects 
other than those resulting from state action), even if no improper tactics were 
used.
162
 
Before the ABA entered into a consent decree with the Department of 
Justice in 1995, legal educators made up the majority of the members of the 
ABA Section of Legal Education (and its committees), which administered 
the accreditation process
163
 and could be fairly characterized as a private 
association comprising “market participants.”164 Although the consent decree 
has significantly lessened the influence of legal educators in the accreditation 
process, lawyers still retain almost exclusive control.
165
 While lawyers not 
 
 
 160. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 502-07. See also supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text. 
 161. Id. at 509-10. 
 162. See id. at 515 (White, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority holding on this point). 
 163. See supra note 51. 
 164. While individual legal educators are not literally market participants in that they do not 
personally compete for students, they have a substantial personal stake in preserving the status of 
accredited law schools and thus could be viewed as interested participants. 
 165. The consent decree limits the role of law school deans and faculty in the ABA accreditation 
process as follows: they may make up no more than 50% of the members of the Council to the Section 
of Legal Education, the Accreditation Committee, the Standards Review Committee, and no more than 
40% of the nominating committee for the officers of the Section of Legal Education. Furthermore, 
each site-inspection team should, to the extent possible, include at least two members who are not 
legal educators. The decree also requires the ABA to hire an independent consultant, who is not a legal 
educator, to assist in validating all standards and interpretations. United States v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 934 
F. Supp. 435, 437 (D.D.C. 1996).  
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involved in legal education do not literally compete with law schools seeking 
accreditation, they still have an interest in the process because accreditation 
implicates the status, income, and general well being of the profession as a 
whole. Thus, lawyers may have a collective self-interest in using 
accreditation to control entry into the profession.
166
 Under a broad reading of 
Allied Tube, this collective self-interest would mean that no participant in 
formulating the ABA accreditation standards would enjoy petitioning 
immunity for the effects of those standards. 
While the implications of Allied Tube are far from clear, it is safe to say 
that the case certainly does not compel an extension of either state action 
(which the court did not discuss) or petitioning immunity to the ABA’s 
formulation of accreditation standards. To the extent that both doctrines are 
based on statutory interpretation, they should be construed narrowly.
167
 
Furthermore, public policy would seem to favor denying immunity for the 
standards in the accreditation context. When states adopt private standard-
setting rules (including accreditation decisions), state attention to the 
underlying standards is usually infeasible as a practical matter. This is 
because accrediting and other rule-making generally involve specialized 
fields requiring expertise. Although state officials may have some experience 
in the field, they typically do not have the resources or specific knowledge 
needed to make substantive inquiries into the merits of the group’s 
recommendations, much less the reasonableness of the standards underlying 
those recommendations. We can assume that when state officials adopt a 
group’s recommendations, it is because the group (perhaps by its reputation) 
has convinced them of the action’s general desirability. The state officials 
merely place their trust in the rule-making group with respect to the 
standards’ integrity. 
While the political right to petition is important and may justify a group’s 
persuasion of the state to adopt its decisions, this right should not be broadly 
 
 
 166. For example, the American Medical Association and its Council on Medical Education, 
which dominate the accrediting body for medical schools, have been criticized for using accreditation 
to limit the number of doctors entering the medical profession, thereby limiting future competition. See 
supra note 8. Documentation shows that members of the legal profession, in the early days of ABA 
accreditation, wanted to use the process to control primarily the social and ethnic composition of the 
profession. See infra notes 301-05 and accompanying text. 
 167. Antitrust tradition demands narrow construction of all exemptions. See, e.g., Union Labor 
Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 126 (1982); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975) 
(stating that “there is a heavy presumption against implicit exemptions,” even in areas where Congress 
has enacted a special regulatory scheme). Even if the petitioning immunity doctrine is based on First 
Amendment principles and not on statutory interpretation of the antitrust laws, it should still be given a 
limited interpretation. First Amendment protection for content-neutral regulations tends to be limited, 
unless the regulations unduly burden speech and there is no alternative avenue of expression. See 
LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 789-94 (2d ed. 1988).  
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construed to shield the standards on which the decisions were made when the 
accrediting body never sought to persuade the state of the reasonableness of 
the standards. As to state action immunity, because states do not specifically 
approve (or even review) the underlying accreditation standards, but merely 
give effect to the accreditation decisions, the standards themselves should not 
be construed as an act of the state.
168
 If they are not acts of the state as 
sovereign, they must be clearly authorized and actively supervised by the 
state before state action immunity applies.
169
 The formulation and application 
of ABA accreditation standards clearly do not meet these requirements. 
C. Free Speech and the First Amendment 
Although the Supreme Court frequently speaks of constitutional 
principles in petitioning immunity cases, it has traditionally based the 
doctrine on a statutory interpretation of the antitrust laws, construed in light 
of constitutional principles, rather than on the First Amendment right to 
petition.
170
 More recently, a First Amendment free speech protection 
argument has been made for accreditation. This argument contends that 
accreditation, standing alone, does not constitute a restraint at all but is 
merely “speech.”171 It is premised on the notion that accreditation carries no 
coercive sanctions (the denial or withdrawal of accreditation is not 
considered a sanction under this theory) and is, therefore, merely a 
professional group’s expression of its private opinion concerning quality.172 
Essentially, this view draws a distinction between collaborating to set 
standards and evaluating whether they have been met on the one hand, and 
explicitly agreeing to follow the set standards and sanctioning 
noncompliance on the other.
173
 Under this view, an accrediting program falls 
 
 
 168. Although the Supreme court in Hoover considered the allegedly anticompetive bar 
examination grading process an act of the state, Hoover is distinguishable. See Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 
U.S. 558, 576 & n.28 (1984). In Hoover, the Committee on Examination and Admissions was required 
to file its grading formula with the Arizona Supreme Court before they administered the bar 
examination. Id. Thus, the Arizona Supreme Court at least had an opportunity to review the challenged 
grading method. See id. 
 169. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text. 
 170. See, e.g., E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137-38 
(1960) (stating that the Sherman Act’s purpose is to regulate business activity, not political activity, 
and noting that a different construction of the Act would raise First Amendment concerns). See also 
supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 171. See generally Havighurst & Brody, supra note 4, at 216-22. 
 172. See id. at 218-19. 
 173. See Schachar v. Am. Acad. of Ophthalmology, Inc., 870 F.2d 397, 397, 399 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(“There can be no restraint of trade without a restraint . . . . [W]hen a trade association provides 
information . . . but does not constrain others to follow its recommendations, it does not violate the 
antitrust laws.”) (citation omitted); Havighurst & Brody, supra note 4, at 213-16 (viewing 
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within the first category of activities and is not a restraint because it involves 
only speech, which is protected under the First Amendment. If this position is 
valid, the ABA accreditation program would not implicate the Sherman Act 
at all—it would be mere speech and not a restraint. 
At least one district court has apparently taken this approach. In Zavaletta 
v. American Bar Ass’n,174 a trial court dismissed an antitrust accreditation 
case against the ABA on the ground that the ABA’s accreditation activities 
“impose[d] no restraint on trade, unreasonable or otherwise.”175 Noting that 
the ABA neither limited its members’ freedom to hire graduates of 
unaccredited law schools, nor restricted the unaccredited schools’ access to 
prospective students, the district court concluded that the ABA was merely 
expressing “its educated opinion” in denying accreditation.176 Additionally, it 
found that the ABA’s communication of its accreditation decisions to the 
states was a First Amendment protected activity.
177
 
The argument that accreditation is mere speech, and cannot constitute a 
restraint absent explicit coercion or agreement to adhere to the standards, 
seems flawed. It is clear that any coercion or even a simple agreement to 
comply with the standards would subject accreditation activities to antitrust 
review.
178
 While there is a conceptual difference between the collective 
setting of standards and an actual agreement to abide by the agreed-upon 
standards, the distinction is more theoretical than real. Standard setting by a 
group of interested participants carries an implicit expectation or 
understanding that the participants will follow the standards; otherwise 
standard setting would be a meaningless exercise.
179
 Therefore, it is unduly 
formalistic to argue that standard setting is merely an exercise of free speech 
when an explicit agreement by the participants to follow (or enforce) the 
standards is clearly actionable. 
 
 
accreditation as distinct from self-regulation because accreditation does not include any explicit 
agreement to comply with the standards set or any sanction for noncompliance, other than 
nonapproval). 
 174. 721 F. Supp. 96 (E.D. Va. 1989). 
 175. Id. at 98. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See Havighurst & Brody, supra note 4, at 212-13 (agreeing that “a collective agreement to 
boycott anyone who did not follow . . . . standards voluntarily” or “naked agreements among 
competitors to sell only products meeting agreed-upon standards” violate antitrust law). 
 179. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 (1988) (observing 
that “[a]greement on a product standard is, after all, implicitly an agreement not to manufacture, 
distribute, or purchase certain types of products”). As previously noted, the accreditation activities of 
the ABA Section of Legal Education and its committees could be construed as standard setting by 
interested participants both before and after the 1995 consent decree. See supra notes 163-66 and 
accompanying text. 
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The contention that accrediting is merely speech and not conduct because 
it carries no coercive force on its own
180
 seems equally illusory. In a 
technical sense, compliance with accreditation standards is, indeed, 
voluntary. Schools are not compelled to follow the standards and punishment 
is not meted out to those that do not, except to the extent that accreditation is 
denied or withdrawn. Thus, law schools that are indifferent to accreditation 
are perfectly free not to heed its standards. Given the practical reality that 
ABA approval is critical for the survival of most law schools,
181
 however, it 
is disingenuous to say that accreditation denial or withdrawal for 
noncompliance with the standards is not a form of sanction. 
In one antitrust case unrelated to accreditation, the Seventh Circuit said, in 
effect, that speech unaccompanied by coercion or sanction cannot be 
considered a restraint. But the speech in that case, Schachar v. American 
Academy of Ophthalmology, Inc.,
182
 was classic speech and is very different 
from the so-called “speech” in standard setting. Schachar involved an 
American Academy of Ophthalmology (Academy) press release that 
described a new surgical ophthalmology procedure as “experimental,” called 
for more research, and urged caution on the part of patients, doctors, and 
hospitals alike.
183
 Several ophthalmologists sued the Academy alleging that 
the press release constituted a restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman 
Act. Holding for the defendant, the Seventh Circuit said that simply stating 
an opinion without constraining others to follow it is not a restraint,
184
 and 
that “[a]n organization’s towering reputation does not reduce its freedom to 
speak out.”185 
The Seventh Circuit stressed that the Academy did nothing other than 
issue its press release. It did not require members to cease performing the 
procedure, discipline, or expel anyone for disregarding its warning. Nor did it 
induce hospitals to restrict those surgeries or urge insurers to withhold 
payment for them.
186
 In other words, it was pure speech, with no implicit 
agreements and no coercion or sanction in any form for dissidents. In 
contrast, accreditation usually involves an implicit understanding among 
participating schools that they will adhere to the standards. There is also 
coercion and sanction in the sense that failure to comply with those standards 
 
 
 180. See Havighurst & Brody, supra note 4, at 212-16 (arguing that collective accreditation, 
standing alone, sanctions no one and should be considered mere speech rather than a restraint). 
 181. See supra note 3. 
 182. 870 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 183. Id. at 398.  
 184. Id. at 399. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 398.  
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results in a loss of accreditation status or a failure to obtain such valuable 
status. 
Moreover, even assuming that accrediting does constitute mere speech, 
antitrust immunity does not necessarily follow. That the First Amendment 
does not provide blanket protection for commercial speech is beyond 
debate.
187
 In an analysis articulated in Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service 
Commission,
188
 the Supreme Court said that for commercial speech to come 
within the First Amendment clause, it must “concern lawful activity and not 
be misleading.”189 In other words, untruthful, misleading, or deceptive 
statements do not enjoy absolute constitutional protection.
190
 For example, in 
a case involving a false pre-announcement of a new product, the Seventh 
Circuit held that a “knowingly false statement designed to deceive buyers” 
could constitute an exclusionary practice violative of the Sherman Act.
191
 
Even speech that is normally labeled “opinion” is not automatically entitled 
to absolute First Amendment protection
192
 because expressions of opinion 
“often imply an assertion of objective fact”193 that can be as deceptive or 
misleading as statements of fact.
194
 It would be difficult, of course, to 
characterize the normative judgment of an accreditation standard as 
deceptive.
195
  
However, even for speech that concerns lawful activity and is not 
misleading, government regulation would still be permissible under Central 
Hudson if the government interest in such regulation is substantial, if the 
regulation directly advances the government interest, and if the regulation of 
 
 
 187. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-57 (1978) (recognizing a distinction 
between commercial speech, which is traditionally subject to government regulation, and other 
varieties of speech); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771-
72 (1976) (stating that, especially in the area of commercial speech, the government may restrict 
speech that is not demonstrably false, but merely deceptive or misleading). 
 188. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).  
 189. Id. at 566.  
 190. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72; MCI Communications Corp. v. Am. 
Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1129 (7th Cir.), modified by 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 65,520 (7th 
Cir. 1983). 
 191. See MCI Communications, 708 F.2d at 1128. 
 192. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1990) (noting that statements 
couched as opinion but implying a false assertion of fact may be actionable libel); Washington v. 
Smith, 80 F.3d 555, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“There is no categorical First Amendment immunity against 
defamation suits for statements of opinion.”). 
 193. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18. 
 194. Id. at 19. 
 195. On the other hand, an inaccurate finding of noncompliance with the standards, rather than the 
judgment guiding the formulation of the standards, can be more easily attacked as untruthful or 
deceptive. 
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the speech in question is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
196
 Preventing 
anticompetitive conduct, which application of the antitrust laws is intended to 
do, is obviously a substantial government interest; and applying the antitrust 
laws to alleged restraints of trade that are effectuated by speech, not overt 
acts, directly advances that government interest. Affording blanket First 
Amendment protection to seals of approval, standard setting, and 
accreditation on the grounds that mere speech is involved would ignore 
market realities. Restraints of trade can be effectuated by speech, as well as 
by overt acts, and they can be just as harmful to competition. For example, if 
a group of competitors creates a seal of approval based on subjective factors 
and denies approval to pesky competitors for the primary purpose of 
excluding or disadvantaging them, the effects of this “speech” may be as 
anticompetitive as if the parties had used traditional “conduct” activities to 
engage in a boycott. In that event, the government’s interest in preventing 
these anticompetitive effects is substantial and the use of the antitrust laws to 
circumscribe the “speech” directly serves this government interest. Thus 
under Central Hudson, the application of the antitrust laws to such 
commercial speech would be entirely appropriate assuming that its use is no 
broader than necessary. 
Similarly, if it is alleged, in a law school situation, that any of the ABA 
accreditation standards (“speech”) were promulgated to lessen competition, it 
would seem that subjecting that “speech” to antitrust review would advance a 
substantial government interest. To the extent that a rule of reason analysis is 
applied to determine antitrust liability, the regulation is “not more extensive 
than necessary”197 to serve the government interest in protecting competition 
and should be quite permissible under the First Amendment. 
IV. IS LAW SCHOOL ACCREDITATION ANTICOMPETITIVE? 
Even if the accreditation process is not immune from antitrust scrutiny, as 
the above discussion concludes, whether it is unlawful under the antitrust 
laws is a separate issue that must be addressed. With any meaningful 
accreditation system, some will inevitably fail to satisfy the standards and 
will be denied approval. When the individuals who set and apply the 
standards are the unsuccessful applicants’ competitors, a concerted refusal to 
deal or group boycott exists by definition.
198
 Although group boycotts have 
 
 
 196. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.  
 197. Id.  
 198. The term “group boycott,” also referred to as concerted refusals to deal, covers a wide variety 
of conduct, including an association’s exclusion (or limitation of access) of others from their 
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traditionally been characterized as per se illegal,
199
 the rule of reason, rather 
than the per se rule,
200
 is likely to be applied to law school accreditation. 
Under the rule of reason, courts analyze whether a restraint is, on balance, 
anticompetitive. As developed by lower courts, this test generally entails an 
examination of the effects of the restraint in a defined relevant market. If the 
restraint is harmful to competition, courts ask whether the restraint, 
nonetheless, has a legitimate objective; if it does, courts question whether the 
restraint is reasonably necessary to achieve that legitimate objective.
201
 The 
following explores these issues and concludes that, under the rule of reason, 
ABA accreditation is on balance anticompetitive and hence a violation of 
section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
A. The Rule of Reason Governs 
Assuming that state action and petitioning immunity doctrines do not 
apply, accreditation activities are unquestionably within the reach of the 
Sherman Act. Although an earlier court of appeals decision, Marjorie 
Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass’n of Colleges & Secondary 
 
 
association or joint venture. See, e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & 
Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 293-94 (1985); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 21-22 
(1945). Trade or professional associations are treated as combinations of their members so that the 
activities of these associations are considered the collective conduct of their members, thus satisfying 
the “agreement” or “combination” requirement of section 1 of the Sherman Act. See VII AREEDA & 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 75, ¶ 1477, at 343. 
 199. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 145-46 (1966); Radiant Burners, 
Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 659-60 (1961); Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale 
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 211-12 (1959); Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 
312 U.S. 457, 467-68 (1941); E. States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 
611-12 (1914); Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38, 45-47 (1904). 
 200. Per se illegality means that the conduct is conclusively presumed illegal, without regard to 
the restraint’s actual effects or the possible procompetitive justifications. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United 
States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). The rule of reason analysis is used to determine the anticompetitiveness 
of all restraints not subject to the per se rule. The rule of reason test involves a detailed inquiry into 
whether the restraint is harmful to competition, whether there is a legitimate justification for it, and 
whether the restraint is reasonably necessary to achieve that legitimate justification. See infra notes 
227-32 and accompanying text. 
 201. See, e.g., Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56-57 (2d Cir. 1997); Orson, 
Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1367-68 (3d Cir. 1996); K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs., Inc. 
v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668-
69 (3d Cir. 1993); Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 543 (2d 
Cir. 1993); Bhan v. NME Hosp. Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1413 (9th Cir. 1991). See also ABA SECTION OF 
ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 53 (4th ed. 1997). If the plaintiff does not satisfy 
the first test (i.e., show harm to competition), no prima facie case is established and there would be no 
need to proceed to the second step. If an anticompetitive harm is established, however, the burden then 
shifts to the defendant to demonstrate a legitimate objective for the harm. If he can show such an 
objective (or redeeming virtue), then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the restraint is 
not reasonably necessary to achieve the plaintiff’s procompetitive objective. Id.  
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Schools,
202
 found that the Sherman Act did not apply to accreditation 
activities conducted with a “noncommercial” purpose,203 the continued 
validity of this case is doubtful after Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.
204
 
Goldfarb refused to find a “learned profession[]”205 exemption from the 
Sherman Act, observing that “the exchange of . . . a service for money is 
‘commerce.’”206 Subsequent Supreme Court cases have consistently 
followed Goldfarb in applying the Sherman Act to professional activities, 
thus making it clear that these activities are considered business related and 
subject to antitrust review.
207
 More recently, in United States v. Brown 
University,
208
 a case involving an on-going agreement among Ivy League 
schools to fix the level of financial assistance offered to admitted students,
209
 
the Third Circuit quickly dismissed the schools’ claim that their nonprofit 
status provided an exemption from the Sherman Act, holding that the 
payment of money for an education is commerce.
210
 Probably recognizing 
that a nonprofit or educational exemption claim is untenable today, the ABA 
apparently did not even raise this defense in Massuchetts School of Law.
211
 
The more difficult question is whether the per se rule or the rule of reason 
should apply. Group boycotts, or the concerted refusals of competitors to 
deal with another competitor, are commonly said to be per se illegal.
212
 Over 
 
 
 202. 432 F.2d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (finding that “the process of accreditation is an activity 
distinct from the sphere of commerce; it goes rather to the heart of the concept of education itself,” and 
that because the accrediting body had noncommercial intent, the accreditation activities were outside 
the Sherman Act’s reach). 
 203. Id. 
 204. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
 205. Id. at 786.  
 206. Id. at 787. 
 207. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 759 (1999) (requiring a 
rule of reason analysis, not the “quick look,” to determine the legality of a professional rule banning a 
broad range of advertising); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 
(1990) (holding per se illegal an agreement among members of an association of criminal defense 
lawyers not to represent indigent criminal defendants until the government raised their compensation 
rates); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (finding dentists’ collective 
refusal to submit x-rays to patients’ insurers to be an illegal antitrust restraint); Ariz. v. Maricopa 
County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (holding that doctors’ setting of maximum fees for specific 
medical procedures constituted price fixing and was per se illegal); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. 
United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (finding professional rule prohibiting competitive bidding among 
engineers to be an antitrust violation). 
 208. 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 209. Id. at 662.  
 210. Id. at 666. 
 211. I draw the conclusion that the ABA did not raise this exemption from the fact that neither the 
Third Circuit nor the district court mentioned this issue in its respective opinion. See Mass. Sch. of 
Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 107 F.3d 1026 (3d Cir. 1997); Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, 
Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 937 F. Supp. 435 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
 212. See supra note 199. 
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the years, however, this “black-letter” law has become riddled with 
exceptions as courts began to question the economic impact of boycotts and 
became unwilling to summarily condemn arrangements that were not 
obviously anticompetitive.
213
 This shift from per se illegality is particularly 
true with respect to the many concerted refusals to deal that are ancillary to 
legitimate joint ventures or cooperative endeavors formed by competitors for 
efficiency reasons.
214
 Today, a more apt description of the law on concerted 
refusals to deal is that the rule of reason applies, unless the group refusing to 
deal has “market power or unique access to a business element necessary for 
effective competition,”215 or when the group boycott’s only possible purpose 
is to facilitate a naked restraint.
216
 
Even though the ABA possesses market power in the legal education 
industry,
217
 and accreditation is necessary for the successful operation of a 
law school,
218
 it seems unlikely that any court would apply the per se rule to 
an antitrust analysis of ABA accreditation. Though the Sherman Act has 
been held applicable to the professions since Goldfarb,
219
 the Supreme Court 
 
 
 213. Sometimes courts do not invoke the per se rule by simply refusing to characterize conduct 
resembling a concerted refusal to deal as such. See, e.g., Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 458 
(declining to “forc[e]” dentists’ collective refusal to supply insurers with patient x-rays “into the 
‘boycott’ pigeonhole,” despite the conduct’s resemblance to practices that have been considered per se 
illegal group boycotts). See also Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 719 F.2d 207, 221 (7th Cir. 1983) (refusing 
to apply the per se rule to a medical association’s boycott of chiropractors because the economic 
impact of the boycott was not readily apparent). 
 214. See, e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 
284 (1985); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Nat’l 
Bancard Corp. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592 (11th Cir. 1986); Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City 
Enters., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 215. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 298; Fishman v. Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 541 (7th 
Cir. 1986) (holding that a concerted refusal to deal is illegal per se if the defendants either have market 
power or “exclusive access to an element essential to effective competition”) (quoting Northwest 
Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 296). 
 216. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) 
(condemning as per se illegal the collective refusal of a group of criminal defense lawyers to represent 
indigent clients unless and until the government increased their compensation, despite the absence of 
evidence of the group’s market power). See also Denny’s Marina, Inc. v. Renfro Prods., Inc., 8 F.3d 
1217 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding a group boycott per se illegal where a trade association of marine 
products dealers excluded from the association another dealer who regularly met or beat other 
competitors’ prices); Collins v. Associated Pathologists, 844 F.2d 473, 479 (7th Cir. 1988) (observing 
that boycotts are illegal per se only if used to enforce agreements that are themselves illegal per se). 
 217. There are presently 183 ABA-accredited law schools in the nation and 21 unaccredited law 
schools, and over 40 states require a degree from an ABA-accredited law school as a condition for bar 
admission. See OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA-APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS, supra note 3, at 56-65 (listing 
183 accredited schools); BARRON’S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 557-63 (listing 21 unaccredited schools). 
Thus, it is clear that the ABA, as the accrediting body, has the power to control the legal education 
market.  
 218. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 219. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
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has generally been unwilling to find the collective decisions of professional 
associations per se unlawful,
220
 unless those decisions are tantamount to price 
fixing.
221
 While some of the ABA accreditation standards may be overly 
restrictive,
222
 it is difficult to make the case that they are naked restraints 
deserving of per se treatment.
223
 
Because concerted refusals to deal in the accreditation context refer to the 
exclusion of unaccredited schools, application of the per se rule is even less 
probable. For accreditation to have any utility, an accrediting body must be 
able to deny accreditation to those who fail to meet the established standards. 
Accreditation programs are usually administered by professionals in the 
field
224
 who are, as previously noted, considered interested market 
participants;
225
 therefore, by definition, a concerted refusal to deal exists 
whenever accreditation is denied or withdrawn. Yet it is rational to have such 
market participants administer the program, despite their self-interested 
status, because they have the expertise, knowledge, and competence to make 
the requisite quality judgments. Once we accept the premise that 
accreditation administered in good faith by interested participants often 
serves the consumers’ best interests, per se rule application to accrediting 
makes little sense. Thus, the rule of reason, rather than the per se rule, would 
likely be applied in any evaluation of the ABA accrediting standards’ 
legality.
226
 
 
 
 220. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756 (1999) (remanding for a 
rule of reason analysis to a professional rule that set severe limits on advertising); Fed. Trade Comm’n 
v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986) (noting that the Court has “been slow to condemn 
rules adopted by professional associations as unreasonable per se”); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. 
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692-96 (1978) (declining to apply the per se rule because the restraint was 
adopted by a professional association, but finding the restraint unlawful under an abbreviated rule of 
reason); Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 719 F.2d 207, 221 (7th Cir. 1983) (declining to apply the per se rule 
to a medical association rule that effectively limited competition from chiropractors partly because of 
the Supreme Court’s historical reluctance to apply that test to professional organizations). 
 221. See, e.g., California Dental, 526 U.S. at 771-74 (insisting on a full rule of reason analysis 
instead of the intermediate quick-look test in a case involving a dental association’s ban of a broad 
range of advertising—a practice that is usually regarded as similar to price fixing); Fed. Trade 
Comm’n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990). 
 222. See infra notes 287-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of the standards. 
 223. But see Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 4, at 2221-25 (arguing that ABA accreditation 
constitutes a price-fixing agreement of law school faculty effectuated by a group boycott, and should 
be treated as per se illegal). 
 224. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.  
 225. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.  
 226. An abbreviated or quick-look rule of reason is sometimes applied to restraints that are naked 
restraints on price or output or are otherwise obviously anticompetitive. The quick-look is a hybrid of 
the per se rule and the rule of reason. Under this intermediate test, the plaintiff is not required to 
formally prove market power or anticompetitive effect (unlike the full-fledged rule of reason), but the 
defendant is allowed to show procompetitive justification (unlike the per se rule). In California Dental, 
the Supreme Court sharply curtailed the application of the quick-look inquiry. 526 U.S. at 771-74. It is 
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The rule of reason, as formulated by Justice Brandeis in Board of Trade 
of Chicago v. United States,
227
 calls for an open-ended, multi-factored test.
228
 
In practice, this test has evolved into a three-step structured analysis.
229
 
Initially, the plaintiff must show that the restraint has substantially harmed or 
is likely to substantially harm competition.
230
 If the plaintiff makes this 
showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to show a legitimate objective for 
the restraint.
231
 If the defendant succeeds, the burden shifts back to the 
plaintiff to prove that either the restraint is not reasonably necessary or that 
less restrictive alternatives could effectuate the legitimate objective.
232
 
 
 
therefore now unlikely that an accreditation case would be analyzed under a quick-look test, rather 
than the full rule of reason. For a more extensive discussion of California Dental and its implications 
on the rule of reason in the context of professional restraints, see generally Marina Lao, The Rule of 
Reason and Horizontal Restraints Involving Professionals, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 499, 507-12 (2000). 
 227. 246 U.S. 231 (1918). 
 228. See id. at 238.  
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps 
thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. 
To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to 
which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature 
of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to 
exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are 
all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable 
regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and 
to predict consequences. 
Id. 
 229. The rule of reason analysis evolved into this structured inquiry primarily because the Board 
of Trade of Chicago formulation was seen as too unwieldy to be applied efficiently.  
 230. The plaintaiff establishes a prima facie case only upon proof of the anticompetive effect of 
the challenged restraint. See L.A. Draper & Son v. Wheelbrator-Frye, Inc., 735 F.2d 414, 422 (11th 
Cir. 1984). Anticompetive effect can be demonstrated by evidence of an actual adverse effect on 
competition or, in the alternative, by defining the relevant market and proving defendant’s market 
power in that defined market. See, e.g., Flegel v. Christian Hosp., N.E.-N.W., 4 F.3d 682, 688 (8th Cir. 
1993); Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 546-47 (2d Cir. 
1993); Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1413 (9th Cir. 1991).  
 231. See, e.g., Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997); K.M.B. 
Warehouse Distribs., Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 1995); Capital Imaging, 996 
F.2d at 547; Bhan, 929 F.2d at 1413. 
 232. See, e.g., Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998); 
Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1368 (3d Cir. 1996); K.M.G. Warehouse, 61 F.3d at 
127; Flegel, 4 F.3d at 688; United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993); Clorox, 117 
F.3d at 56; Bhan, 929 F.2d at 1413; Yeager’s Fuel, Inc. v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 953 F. Supp. 617, 
657 (E.D. Pa. 1997). If the plaintiff satisfies this burden, she prevails. Otherwise, the court then 
balances the anticompetitive harms against the benefits. See VII AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 
75, ¶ 1507, at 397. 
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B. Harm to Competition 
Two most obvious measures of anticompetitive effect are output and 
price.
233
 Competition is impaired if a restraint reduces output or raises prices 
in the relevant markets,
234
 of which there are two in the case of law school 
accreditation
235—the legal education market236 and the legal services 
market.
237
 Assuming that the bar examinations’ difficulty level remains 
constant, accreditation’s adverse impact on output in both markets is clear. If 
the ABA lifted or relaxed its accreditation standards, there would probably be 
more law schools and more law students.
238
 Schools that might not meet 
current accreditation standards (such as MSL) would likely emerge, survive, 
and perhaps even flourish. Even in states, such as California, where the lack 
of ABA approval does not mean effective exclusion from the law school 
market, accreditation may still have anticompetitive effects. Accreditation 
tends to distort competition because consumers usually do not look behind 
the seal of approval. Thus, unaccredited schools are put at a competitive 
disadvantage in the recruitment of good faculty and students, among other 
things. 
In the legal services market, the output effect of accreditation, though 
indirect, is also evident. Again, if bar examination difficulty is held 
 
 
 233. See, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 
85, 104 (1984) (“Because it restrains price and output, the NCAA’s television plan has a significant 
potential for anticompetitive effects.”); Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 20 (1979) (stating that 
the test of anticompetitiveness is whether the challenged practice would “tend to restrict competition 
and decrease output”). 
 234. See Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 104. 
 235. Relevant product markets are defined by looking to economic conditions and applying the 
tests of elasticity of demand or supply. To illustrate, if the price of X were to rise, and consumers 
would reasonably substitute X with the purchase of Y, X, and Y would be said to be in the same product 
market. In United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., the Court engaged in a fairly lengthy 
discussion of what constitutes the relevant product market. 351 U.S. 377, 394-400 (1956). The Court 
determined that the relevant product market is defined by the “cross elasticity of demand between 
products” and the reasonable “interchangeability” of the product. Id. at 398-400.  
 236. Because there are currently no substitutes for law schools for consumers who wish to become 
lawyers (apprenticeship and self-study are no longer acceptable alternatives in most states), the law 
school or legal education market is a defined antitrust market. If tuition of one law school rises, 
prospective legal education consumers can turn only to other law schools—other sources of legal 
training will not suffice in most states. 
 237. Similarly, consumers who need legal representation can turn only to lawyers because, in 
every state, only state-licensed lawyers are authorized to practice law. If a lawyer raises fees, a 
potential client can turn to other licensed attorneys for legal representation, but not to nonlawyers. 
Accordingly, the legal services market represents a separate antitrust market that, as discussed below, 
law school accreditation may affect.  
 238. Whether there would be more law schools offering programs of acceptable quality, and more 
law graduates who are adequately prepared for the practice of law, is another question that will be 
discussed below. See infra Parts IV.C.2-3. 
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constant,
239
 it is reasonable to expect that lower accreditation standards 
would result in a greater supply of lawyers and, therefore, greater consumer 
access to legal services.
240
 Even assuming that students attending the lesser 
law schools receive a relatively inferior education, it is fair to assume that a 
percentage of them would eventually pass the bar examination and become 
licensed attorneys.
241
 
Accreditation’s adverse impact on price in the legal education market is 
also clear. Changing accreditation standards to permit the operation of less 
expensive alternative law schools, such as MSL, would mean lower tuition 
for students attending those schools.
242
 Furthermore, the price pressure of 
these alternative schools would likely bring down the tuition of at least some 
lower-tiered accredited schools.
243
 Whether there would be a similar 
downward trend in legal fees (i.e., price reduction in the legal services 
market) is less certain, however. There should probably be some impact in 
market segments served predominantly by sole practitioners and small 
 
 
 239. States may, of course, choose to make the bar examination more difficult (or otherwise limit 
bar pass rates) if accreditation standards are eased. In that event, we cannot say with certainty that 
accreditation has reduced the output of lawyers. However, the statement that accreditation adversely 
affects output would still be correct because it tampers with the “ordinary give and take of the 
marketplace” in achieving market output. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 
447, 459 (1986) (quoting United States v. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 404 F. Supp. 457, 460 (1975), 
quoted in Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)). 
 240. Some may argue that we already have a surplus of lawyers, not a deficit. But it is assumed, in 
antitrust law, that the correct output should be determined by consumer demand. If there is, indeed, an 
oversupply of lawyers, we would expect demand for legal education to decrease. To the extent that 
there is apparently demand fueling the interest in schools such as MSL and Concord, we have to 
assume that either the market for legal services may not be as saturated as is widely assumed, or 
prospective students may be misinformed about employment prospects. If prospective students are 
misinformed, demand for legal education should drop once the market becomes informed and market 
equilibrium is restored. The antitrust law does not permit private regulation of supply in other 
industries, and there is no particular reason why legal education should be treated differently in this 
respect. 
 241. To use California as an example, graduates of non ABA-approved schools had a bar pass rate 
of 20% for 1999, as contrasted with 56% for graduates of ABA-approved schools. THE LAWYER’S 
ALMANAC 2001 E-334 (2001). 
 242. For example, the present tuition at MSL for full-time study is $10,800 a year, which is about 
55% of the average tuition at private law schools. See BARRON’S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 560. The 
tuition at Concord, the online law school operated by Kaplan, is only $5,000 a year. See supra note 12; 
Concord Law School, at http://www.concordlawschool/com/info/custom/concord/admissions/ 
tuitionfees.asp (last visited May 27, 2001). 
 243. Some of the weaker existing accredited law schools might lose students to the new lower-
cost schools if students do not believe that the weaker, but traditional, schools offer sufficient added-
value to justify their additional cost. In the long run, some of these weaker, but presently ABA-
accredited, law schools might follow the new low-cost model, seek to upgrade their quality, or go out 
of business. While these uncertainties may be uncomfortable for those who might be affected, that is 
how the market system works in other industries and there is really no justification for treating law 
schools differently. 
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firms,
244
 but not in those sectors generally represented by larger law firms. 
This differing effect is to be expected because the legal profession seems to 
be divided into two spheres so separate that they can hardly be said to 
constitute the same market: attorneys in sole and small practices representing 
mostly individuals and some small businesses, and attorneys in large firms 
representing large organizations.
245
 Easing the accreditation standards would 
primarily raise the number of lower-tiered schools’ graduates. Given the 
hierarchical nature of our profession,
246
 these graduates would predominantly 
join the personal client and small business service sector, should they choose 
to enter private practice.
247
 Therefore, the price effect of any increase in the 
supply of lawyers caused by the lifting of certain accreditation restrictions 
would largely be confined to the personal client and small business sector. 
In addition to the output and price impact just discussed, accreditation 
may have other anticompetitive effects. Whatever its benefits, accreditation 
also brings about a certain amount of product standardization and effectively 
 
 
 244. I recognize that many in the profession believe that there is already cut-throat competition in 
this segment. Assuming that this perception is true, the appropriate remedy cannot be to raise 
unreasonable barriers to entry. Perhaps the better solution is for the bar to educate the public on the 
value of seeking legal counsel. This would increase general demand for legal services, which would 
benefit both consumers and practitioners—consumers would receive more legal services, and 
practitioners would have higher volume practices. Another common complaint of many lawyers who 
serve this market segment is that individual clients often do not value good lawyering and are 
unwilling to pay even comparatively modest fees. To the extent that this is true, perhaps the bar can 
engage in publicity or educational campaigns to raise public awareness of the time and effort that good 
representation requires. 
 245. See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS (1991) (discussing 
the large firm environment); JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE 
SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982) (showing, through a random sample of 777 Chicago lawyers 
in 1977, the marked divide between those who serve business clients and those who serve personal 
clients); Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 531, 538-41 (1994) (describing the two spheres of legal practice); Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price 
of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 957-63 
(2000) (providing empirical evidence to demonstrate the sharp divide between the two spheres of 
representation); John P. Heinz et al., The Changing Character of Lawyers’ Work: Chicago in 1975 and 
1995, 32 L. & SOC’Y REV. 751 (1998) (updating their 1970s study). The income and fee disparities 
between the two groups have grown so wide that one can only conclude that they do not compete in 
the same market but actually constitute different markets. A solo practitioner’s $75/hour fee, for 
example, is unlikely to put much pressure on large firm lawyers’ hourly rates; in addition, corporate 
clients are unlikely to cut costs by transferring their business from an established large firm to a sole or 
small firm practitioner. See Richard H. Sander & E. Douglass Williams, Why Are There So Many 
Lawyers? Perspectives on a Turbulent Market, 14 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 431, 449-51 (1989) (noting 
significant escalation in the incomes of lawyers in large firms, but a fall in income for solo 
practitioners during a period of tremendous increase in the total number of attorneys). 
 246. It is no secret to anyone in the profession that large firms, which primarily serve corporate 
clients, generally hire only graduates from the top law schools or the top graduates from middle-tiered 
schools. All other graduates compete with each other in the personal or very small business sphere. 
 247. Other options available to graduates include governmental employment or nonlegal 
occupations. 
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deprives consumers of options. For example, prospective law students are not 
completely free to choose an on-line law school, such as Concord University 
School of Law,
248
 if they plan to practice outside of California.
249
 Nor can 
they select a cheaper school with minimal library facilities taught mostly by 
adjuncts, such as MSL, even if they were willing to make the price-quality 
tradeoff.
250
 This restriction of choice occurs because an overwhelming 
majority of states excludes graduates of nonaccredited schools from the bar 
examination.
251
 Because consumer choice is a value that antitrust law 
normally cherishes,
252
 accreditation’s limitation of that choice should be 
considered an anticompetitive effect unless the limitation is justified.
253
 
Another potential anticompetitive effect of accreditation relates to 
innovation.
254
 Although it is difficult to show conclusively that accreditation 
has caused stagnation in legal education, a persistent criticism of the system 
is its lack of change over the last fifty years.
255
 It is probably safe to assume 
 
 
 248. See supra note 12. 
 249. See BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS, supra note 2, at 10-11 (listing states in which 
graduates of non ABA-approved law schools are eligible to sit for the bar examination).  
 250. See id.  
 251. See id.  
 252. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986) (stating that a 
horizontal agreement to restrain trade that limits “consumer choice by impeding the ‘ordinary give and 
take of the marketplace’ cannot be sustained under the Rule of Reason”) (internal citation omitted). 
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highland Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610 (1985) (noting that defendant’s 
refusal to deal with plaintiff did not allow “consumers to make their own choice on these matters of 
quality”); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 102 
(1984) (stating that conduct would be deemed procompetitive when such “actions widen consumer 
choice”). See generally Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice: The Practical Reason 
for Both Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 10 LOY. CONSUMER L. REP. 44 (1998) (discussing 
the interaction between antitrust and consumer protection laws); Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice 
As the Ultimate Goal of Antitrust, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 503 (2001) (discussing the theory of consumer 
choice); Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust As Consumer Choice: Comments on the New Paradigm, 62 
U. PITT. L. REV. 535 (2001) (discussing antitrust law through a consumer choice paradigm).  
 253. See supra notes 201, 231 and accompanying text.  
 254. The importance of innovation to consumer welfare and, hence, to antitrust is increasingly 
being recognized. See, e.g., CHARLES J. GOETZ & FRED S. MCCHESNEY, ANTITRUST LAW: 
INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 423 (1988) (arguing that innovation is often the essence of 
competition); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 140-240 (1994) (arguing that 
joint ventures that increase industry-wide innovation should be treated as procompetitive and legal); 
Richard J. Gilbert & Steven C. Sunshine, Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency Concerns in Merger 
Analysis: The Use of Innovation Markets, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 569 (1995) (discussing the importance of 
innovation in antitrust analysis). 
 255. See, Competition I, supra note 1, at 314 (stating that “legal education has been a nondynamic 
industry, slow to change and short on innovation”); Competition II, supra note 1, at 1076-78 
(describing criticisms of the lack of innovation and diversity in legal education); Shepherd & 
Shepherd, supra note 4, at 2182-85 (arguing that ABA accreditation reduces the pace of innovation). 
But see John A. Sebert, Modest Proposals to Improve and Preserve the Law School Accreditation 
Process, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 431, 435 (1995) (rejecting the notion that ABA accreditation standards 
impede improvements or produce inappropriate commonality in legal education, and suggesting that 
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that, with fewer accreditation constraints, there would be more 
experimentation with alternative programs, especially programs that 
substantially lower costs or otherwise have student appeal, such as two-year 
J.D. programs.
256
 Indeed, there might even be proposals for more daring and 
controversial low-budget programs that seem unimaginable today. An 
enterprising school might be convinced, for example, that academically 
weaker students could be more cheaply, and as effectively, taught through a 
series of bar review type courses, combined with a few required college-level 
writing courses, than in an expensive, elite-style, traditional program. My 
point is not that any “wild” alternative program is beneficial to consumers, 
but that an overly standardized system impedes experimentation and deprives 
unorthodox schools of the opportunity to demonstrate their program’s 
potential merits.
257
 
C. Legitimate Objectives (or Benefits to Consumers) 
Under the rule of reason, not all restraints with anticompetitive effects 
will be condemned: those with redeeming virtues may be lawful.
258
 Although 
law school accreditation almost certainly has an adverse output and price 
 
 
“to the extent that the standards now do create significant barriers to change, those barriers are 
generally justified”). 
 256. See Competition II, supra note 1, at 1077-78 (describing various unsuccessful attempts to 
change the three-year course of study requirement); Chris Klein, Revolution from Above? A Judge 
Calls for Two-Year J.D. Program, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 14, 1996, at A12 (reporting on Judge Richard 
Posner’s proposal, made at a panel discussion on legal education, that the J.D. program should be 
market driven and trimmed to two years—a proposal with which other panelists, including Judge 
Guido Calebresi, disagreed).  
 257. Accreditation may also hinder innovation in the legal profession in a broader sense. 
Standardization obviously creates a commonality in legal education. This commonality, in turn, 
produces a degree of homogeneity in reasoning in law students, causing the profession to replicate 
itself. While I am not suggesting that this is undesirable per se, one has to wonder whether any 
dramatic innovations can occur within a system whose members are all inculcated with a uniform set 
of norms and perceptions about legal process. For example, despite a general consensus that litigation 
may not be the most efficient way (or even a desirable way in areas such as divorce and child custody) 
to resolve all legal disputes, innovations in alternative dispute resolution have not been tremendously 
successful. Although there may be many reasons for this failure, the emphasis of law schools on 
appellate cases and the adversarial process cannot help but make it difficult for attorneys to seriously 
contemplate radically different options.  
 258. See, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 
85, 113-14 (1984) (noting that achieving lower costs of production would be a legitimate antitrust 
benefit); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 21-23 (1979) (finding that the creation of a new 
product, that would not have been possible without the restraint, justified the restraint); Continental 
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54 (1977) (considering the achievement of efficiencies a 
“redeeming virtue” in sustaining a restraint under the rule of reason). See also VII AREEDA & 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 75, ¶ 1504, at 377-83 (discussing legitimate justifications under the rule of 
reason). 
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impact on legal education and, to some extent, legal services, law school 
accreditation may be justified if the ABA can demonstrate that it serves a 
legitimate objective.
259
 The following discussion concludes, however, that 
the principal object of the ABA accreditation program is to perpetuate an 
elite system of legal education (to the point of excluding all other systems). 
This objective is not cognizable under the rule of reason and hence cannot 
justify the restraints law school accreditation imposes. 
1. The Value of Accreditation in Providing Information 
A traditional rationale for accreditation (and professional self-regulation 
in general) is that it promotes competition by providing information about 
quality to a market where such information is usually unavailable, thereby 
helping consumers make informed decisions and instilling market confidence 
in the services offered.
260
 In economic terms, this objective is characterized 
as correcting a market failure caused by information asymmetries.
261
 
The theory of information asymmetries posits that wide information 
disparities exist in professional services markets (which includes legal 
education and legal services) between providers and purchasers. The theory’s 
premise is that professional services are highly specialized and highly skilled, 
and that very little specific information about the quality of professional 
services is available to the public. Because of the sophisticated and often 
technical nature of these services, consumers typically lack the knowledge 
needed to understand and evaluate the little information they might have; to 
compare the value of services offered by competing professionals; or to 
judge the quality of their work during or after services are rendered. In 
contrast, professionals in the field have the expertise and competence to 
make these judgments.
262
 
 
 
 259. As to what constitutes legitimacy, Areeda states that “[l]egitimacy lies in consistency with 
the law generally and with the premises of the antitrust laws in particular.” Id. ¶ 1504, at 379. 
 260. See generally Clark C. Havighurst & Nancy M. P. King, Private Crendentialing of Health 
Care Personnel: An Antitrust Perspective (Part I), 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 131, 173-84 (1983) (discussing 
the informational value of credentialing in the health-care industry).  
 261. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. 
ECON. REV. 941, 951-52 (1963) (discussing the use of regulation to combat information asymmetries 
when customers do not have the information or knowledge to make informed market decisions). 
 262. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 490-92 (1970) (discussing the theory of information 
asymmetries); Jack Carr & Frank Mathewson, The Economics of Law Firms: A Study in the Legal 
Organization of the Firm, 33 J.L. & ECON. 307 (1990) (discussing information within the context of 
the legal profession); Hayne E. Leland, Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum 
Quality-Standards, 87 J. POL. ECON. 1328 (1979) (discussing quality deterioration in markets with 
asymmetric information); Richard Schmalensee, A Model of Advertising and Product Quality, 86 J. 
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Given the relative paucity of reliable information on professional services, 
professional self-regulation, including accreditation, generally benefits 
consumers because it fills the information gap and helps consumers select 
and evaluate a professional without incurring high search costs.
263
 Consider, 
for example, a patient who has to select a surgeon. The theory explains that a 
patient would normally have a difficult time doing so based on her own 
assessments of different surgeons’ comparable skills. In fact, she may be 
incapable of evaluating a surgeon’s performance even after receiving 
treatment.
264
 A certification or credentialing program administered by a 
group of expert surgeons would assure patients that any surgeon certified 
under the program has met certain minimum standards established by the 
credentialing body. It would effectively allow consumers to use certification 
and accreditation as a quality measure to help with their selection of a 
professional (or professional service). The search costs would be minimal 
and the selection well-founded. In this respect, accreditation or credentialing 
is procompetitive and is a legitimate objective of a restraint. 
We cannot automatically assume, however, that the ABA accreditation 
program serves this purpose. For the theory to apply to legal education, one 
would have to argue that the intricacies of legal education are so perplexing 
that, without accreditation, prospective law students would have difficulty 
 
 
POL. ECON. 485 (1978); Dennis E. Smallwood & John Conlisk, Product Quality in Markets Where 
Consumers Are Imperfectly Informed, 93 Q.J. ECON. 1 (1979) (discussing market effects of imperfect 
information on product quality); Charles Stuart, Consumer Protection in Markets with Informationally 
Weak Buyers, 12 BELL J. ECON. 562 (1981) (examining the motive for consumer protection in markets 
where consumers lack product quality information). See also Arrow, supra note 261, at 951-52 
(arguing that regulation is necessary when information asymmetry makes it difficult for customers to 
evaluate a product or service); Ira Horowitz, The Economic Foundations of Self-Regulation in the 
Professions, in REGULATING THE PROFESSIONS: A PUBLIC-POLICY SYMPOSIUM 3, 7 (Robert D. Blair 
& Stephen Rubin eds., 1980) (arguing that regulation is needed to protect the public from unqualified 
professionals, where information asymmetries exist); Jonathan Rose, Occupational Licensing: A 
Framework for Analysis, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 189, 191 (1979) (arguing that licensing is necessary 
when consumers are unable to make informed decisions “free from undue exploitation”); Charles L. 
Schultze, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST 35-42 (1977) (arguing that “public provision of 
consumer information” helps the market overcome “uncertainty and information costs”); Alan D. 
Wolfson et al., Regulating the Professions: A Theoretical Framework, in OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE 
AND REGULATION 180, 190-91 (Simon Rottenberg ed., 1980). 
 263. See Keith B. Leffler, Physician Licensure: Competition and Monopoly in American 
Medicine, 21 J.L. & ECON. 165, 172-74 (1978) (suggesting that high information costs may justify 
professional regulation); Rose, supra note 262, at 191; Schultz, supra note 262, at 35-42. 
 264. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 772 (1999) (holding that a 
dental association rule banning a wide range of advertising must be analyzed under the full-fledged 
rule of reason, in part because professional service markets are characterized by information 
asymmetries, making it difficult to “determin[e] whether, and the degree to which, an outcome is 
attributable to the quality of services (like a poor job of tooth-filling) or to something else (like a tough 
walnut)”). See also BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 3-1, at 86 (1995) (“The lay public is 
incapable of adequately evaluating the quality of medical services.”). 
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evaluating different educational programs and would be easily defrauded by 
disreputable law schools. With respect to consumers of legal services, the 
theory would hold only if law’s complexities severely impede consumers’ 
ability to screen out poorly educated lawyers on their own. 
The information justification has relatively little strength with respect to 
consumers of legal education (i.e., prospective law students) because these 
consumers have other sources of information. For example, U.S. News & 
World Report annually rates law schools. Although imperfect, it does provide 
data of interest to students, such as bar passage and job placements rates.
265
 
Given the availability of objective information and the sophistication of 
today’s students, it is unlikely that, in the absence of accreditation, students 
would be easily duped into attending substandard law schools. If they do 
attend poorer quality schools, it would likely be a conscious choice based on 
the students’ grades, or financial and other personal circumstances.266 
With respect to consumers of legal services, accreditation might, indeed, 
serve a useful informational function, at least for a segment of the market. 
Generally, though, the information gap is much narrower in law than in more 
scientific and technical areas such as medicine. Law involves knowledge, not 
so much of science, technology, or immutable features of nature, but of 
socially created norms, rules, and procedures. Good lawyering probably 
depends as much on diffuse skills such as negotiation, communication, and 
the ability to process complicated facts, as on skills grounded in legal 
scholarship and doctrine. Knowledge and skills of this nature are not 
incomprehensible to a layperson.
267
 Therefore, it is much easier for clients, 
especially corporations and sophisticated individuals, to assess the 
competence of an attorney
268
 than a physician, for instance. Furthermore, 
 
 
 265. See America’s Best Graduate Schools: Law Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, April 9, 
2001, at 78 (ranking law schools). A fair criticism of the report is that it leaves out indicia of quality 
that are difficult to quantify. The ABA itself also publishes a guide to all of its accredited law schools. 
This guide provides more information than the U.S. News & Report, but does not rank the schools. See 
OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA-APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS, supra note 3.  
 266. Milton Friedman said that fears about consumers’ inability to make choices for themselves 
are paternalistic and unsound, and that excluding competitors only serves to enhance a profession’s 
income and status. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 148-49 (1962). 
 267. In fact, it is questionable whether these skills have any relation at all to where the lawyer 
once attended law school. Most in the profession, for example, have always known that there is often 
little correlation between how good attorneys are and the ranking of the law school they attended, 
particularly for experienced lawyers.  
 268. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97-103 (1974) (describing repeat users of legal services as 
knowledgeable consumers); Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side 
Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 900-03 (1990) (describing corporate users of legal services as 
increasingly knowledgeable due to their use of in-house counsel); Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside 
Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment and Organizational Representation, 64 IND. L.J. 479, 481-
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corporate and more affluent individual clients tend to rely on larger law 
firms’ lawyers, who have been effectively screened by their firms in the 
hiring process. However, less sophisticated clients who use solo or small firm 
practitioners may have more difficulty evaluating attorney competence on 
their own. For this segment of the market, at least, accreditation does instill a 
measure of trust in the profession and therefore may be a legitimate 
justification. 
2. Quality Benefits of Accreditation Expressed in Terms of Promoting 
Competition 
The Supreme Court, in National Society of Professional Engineers v. 
United States
269
 and subsequent cases,
270
 made clear that only “impact on 
competitive conditions,”271 not quality and other noneconomic benefits, may 
be considered in a rule of reason analysis of antitrust restraints.
272
 The 
Court’s stated rationale for rejecting general welfare justifications was that 
such claims presented a “frontal assault” on antitrust policy,273 which 
assumes that quality is ultimately enhanced by competition, not collective 
decision making by the sellers.
274
 Given the ease with which self-interested 
professionals can create or exaggerate quality claims in order to mask 
anticompetive motives, the Court’s skepticism of such claims is well-
founded.
275
 The rejection of this defense also seems wise as a general rule 
 
 
86 (1989) (noting increased expertise and influence of in-house counsel). 
 269. 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
 270. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990); 
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. 
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 271. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690 (1978). 
 272. See Superior Court Trial Lawyers, 493 U.S. at 421-23 (finding per se illegal an agreement 
among criminal defense lawyers to cease representing indigent criminal defendants unless the 
government of the District of Columbia agreed to increase the lawyers’ compensation rates, regardless 
of the possible social utility of the agreement); Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 462-64 (rejecting the 
dentists’ quality of care defense, on the ground that noneconomic concerns are not legitimate 
justifications for anticompetitive restraints); Regents of the Univ. Okla., 468 U.S. at 104 n.27 (stressing 
that “the criterion to be used in judging the validity of a restraint on trade is its impact on 
competition,” and that the premise underlying the Sherman Act is that competition will ultimately 
yield the lowest prices and highest quality of goods and services); National Society of Prof’l Eng’rs v. 
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (writing that the rule of reason “does not open the field of 
antitrust inquiry to any argument in favor of a challenged restraint that may fall within the realm of 
reason,” but is rather limited to justifications that are competition based). 
 273. Prof’l Engineers, 435 U.S. at 695. 
 274. Id. (“The Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition will 
produce not only lower prices, but also better goods and services.”). The premise of the quality 
justification is that consumers will not make wise cost-quality tradeoffs or other market decisions, thus 
requiring sellers to act in concert in order to bring about quality or social welfare enhancement.  
 275. Although much has been made of the Court’s statements in Professional Engineers and other 
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because the conflicting interests of even well-intentioned market participants 
will almost inevitably color their quality judgments. 
However, a categorical refusal to allow quality considerations to 
influence the formulation and application of accreditation standards seems 
irrational. Accreditation is useful primarily because it informs consumers 
about quality, and therefore one would expect the standards to relate to 
quality. If quality assurance is considered a noneconomic general welfare 
concern and therefore not a proper justification for any restrictive standard, 
then virtually all accreditation programs would violate the antitrust laws. This 
result would be inherently inconsistent with the general consensus that 
accreditation can be procompetitive if it is administered reasonably and in 
good faith.
276
 It would also contradict common sense, for it is no doubt 
socially desirable to have some form of quality control over education. 
This dilemma can be solved by an extension of the market failure theory 
to argue that quality standards may be seen as promoting competition in 
certain situations and, therefore, are properly subject to a rule of reason 
analysis. Phillip Areeda first expressed the insight that a restraint’s general 
welfare benefits can be construed as benefits to competition if the restraint 
corrects a market failure.
277
 In other words, if competition cannot function 
properly because of market imperfections, then a restraint that protects 
quality or social welfare promotes competition if it corrects the condition that 
caused the market failure and the corresponding quality degradation.
278
 
In light of this reasoning, one can reasonably argue that quality assurance 
 
 
cases to the effect that quality, health, and safety concerns, being noneconomic, are not legitimate 
justifications under the rule of reason, I tend to believe that the statements were not intended to be 
taken literally. The Court would not have ignored strong, credible evidence that the health or safety of 
consumers would truly be jeopardized without the restraint. It is important to note that in every case 
where the Court rejected quality claims, the defendants had made broad, unfocused, and unsupported 
arguments that competition would not work. Thus, the Court was probably, and justifiably, skeptical of 
the defendants’ motives and of the need for drastic anticompetitive restraints, given the self-interests of 
the professionals involved. See, e.g., Prof’l Engineers, 435 U.S. 679; Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 
447. 
 276. See supra Part IV.C.1. 
 277. VII AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 75, ¶ 1504, at 382-83. 
 278. Professor Thomas Greaney developed this theme further, suggesting a narrow market failure 
defense in the health care area, which is particularly plagued with market failures. Rather than 
claiming that quality benefits justify a particular restraint, as health care professionals are prone to do, 
he argues for a narrow market failure defense. In other words, in limited circumstances where there is 
a market failure, quality claims in health care can be expressed as improvements in competition. 
Thomas L. Greaney, Quality of Care and Market Failure Defense in Antitrust Health Care Litigation, 
21 CONN. L. REV. 605, 627-49 (1989). And, Professor Peter Hammer has built on these insights to 
make a case that antitrust law should recognize a defense, as “an intramarket second-best tradeoff,” for 
acts that restrain competition under traditional antitrust analysis but advance total welfare. Peter J. 
Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, and the Challenge of 
Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, 98 MICH. L. REV. 849, 882-91 (2000). 
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in legal education is a procompetitive, not merely noneconomic, benefit of 
accreditation (and thus a legitimate objective) because it corrects market 
failures in the legal education industry that would otherwise lead to quality 
deterioration. Two common forms of market failure are information 
asymmetries and externalities.
279
 The economic theory of information 
asymmetries, discussed earlier in connection with accreditation’s role in 
filling the information gap, further asserts that uncorrected information 
disparities ultimately lead to a progressive degrading of professional 
services.
280
 The theory’s premise is this: If consumers lack the expertise and 
competence to discern quality in professional services, they will be unwilling 
to pay a premium for quality, or will otherwise make unwise cost-quality 
tradeoffs. If consumers are unwilling to pay, professionals will have no 
incentive to incur the costs necessary to provide above-average quality 
services. In fact, they may be compelled by market forces to engage in race-
to-the-bottom competition in order to meet consumers’ ill-advised choices. 
The result would be a downward spiral in the quality of professional 
services.
281
 
In the legal education context, the argument would probably be as 
follows: Because of the complexities of law and legal education, students are 
incompetent to evaluate quality differences in law school programs. Left to 
their own devices, they will tend to make ill-advised cost-quality tradeoffs, 
leading to a progressive deterioration in quality as schools compete to be the 
least costly and ignore quality considerations. This, in turn, will result in the 
unleashing of incompetent lawyers on the public. Accreditation would 
correct the market failure by having experts (the ABA) set a minimum level 
of quality that schools must adhere to. The strength of this theory in the 
context of legal education, however, is questionable. There is little support 
for the underlying premise that students are generally uninformed and unable 
to assess quality in law school programs. 
 
 
 279. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 45-49 (1988) (discussing 
externalities, information asymmetries, and other market failures); PAUL R. FERGUSON & GLENYS J. 
FERGUSON, INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 143 (2d ed. 1994) (illustrating the effects of negative 
externalities on price and output); WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 537-53, 748-55 
(5th ed. 1992) (discussing generally market failures caused by externalities and information 
asymmetries); HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 259-63 (2d ed. 1984) (discussing 
externalities and possible remedies); Hammer, supra note 278, at 859-64 (discussing the problem of 
negative externalities and how they may be counteracted). For more extensive discussions of the 
problem of imperfect information, see articles cited supra note 262. 
 280. See Akerlof, supra note 262, at 488-500; J. Howard Beales III, The Economics of Regulating 
the Professions, in REGULATING THE PROFESSIONS, supra note 262, at 125-28; Leland, supra note 262 
(showing, through an economic model, that information asymmetries in health care markets lead 
physicians of above-average quality to withdraw from the market). 
 281. See Akerlof, supra note 262, at 488-500. 
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Probably the better market failure argument is that we need minimum 
standards because a free market will not produce a socially acceptable level 
of quality in legal education. The reason for the free market’s failure to 
achieve this desirable level of quality is that not all of the benefits of a quality 
education accrue to the students and law schools. Therefore, they may opt for 
a lower level of quality than is socially desirable unless action is taken to 
correct the situation. This is termed correcting the market failure in quality 
caused by externalities.
282
 Externalities arise when parties to a transaction do 
not bear the full social costs or enjoy all of the benefits of the transaction. 
Rather, some of these social costs are externalized (or some of the benefits 
accrue to those outside the transaction).
283
 The theory of externalities posits 
that in a free market where externalities exist, there will be a misallocation of 
resources (i.e., market failure) because too many products or services will be 
produced and consumed if some of the social costs can be externalized. The 
reverse will be true if the parties cannot internalize all the benefits.
284
 
Externalities clearly affect education. Society benefits from a well-
educated public as well as suffers from a poorly educated one. Yet, in private 
transactions between students as “buyers” and schools as “sellers,” these 
externalities are not taken into account. Thus, students can be expected to 
undervalue educational quality. The value of higher education to many 
students, for example, may lie in the credentials that it provides while the 
benefit to society derives from the learning and skills that students acquire. 
Most educators have probably observed that, everything else being equal, 
many students prefer a less demanding course even though they would learn 
more in a demanding one. This behavior would seem irrational for buyers, 
who typically want more value for their dollar, unless the value that the buyer 
is most interested in purchasing is the credential. 
In the legal education context, externality problems may exist if the public 
is better served with attorneys whose legal education had greater depth, while 
students require only a minimalist, low-cost, utilitarian program consisting 
almost exclusively of well-organized bar review type courses to pass the bar 
 
 
 282. See supra note 279. 
 283. Id. 
 284. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 279, at 169-70 (discussing the effects of private actors 
failing to internalize the social costs of their actions); FERGUSON & FERGUSON, supra note 279, at 143 
(illustrating that negative externalities cause prices to be lower and output higher than may be socially 
desirable); Hammer, supra note 278, at 860-64 (discussing the effect of negative externalities, such as 
pollution). Pollution provides the classic example of externalities. Companies engaged in activities that 
cause pollution do not internalize all of the associated social costs. As a result, in a free market, the 
level of production of these companies will be higher than is socially desirable. In other words, a 
completely free market will not function efficiently if externalities are present and are not corrected. 
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examination and make a living. Because the total benefits of a better 
education do not all accrue to the students, many students may tend to choose 
a quality of education that is not optimal for society.  
Externalities may explain why education is almost universally subject to 
some form of regulation or supervision. It may also be the reason that 
education, although a business in the sense that it involves the “sale” of 
education to student-buyers,
285
 does not function like other businesses. For 
example, schools will decline to “sell” to a failing student even if the student 
is willing and able to continue to “buy” an education. Moreover, while 
student views are not unimportant, faculty often teach and give assignments 
as they see fit, and schools insist on examinations even if the majority of the 
“buyers” prefer not to have them. In short, ordinary observations about 
education support the conclusion that externalities are a problem in 
education. That is why society insists on taking into account the general 
welfare policy implications of education in transactions between schools and 
students. 
To the extent that externalities exist in education and can be corrected 
with accreditation, seeking to protect quality in legal education, in principle, 
can be construed as promoting competition—a legitimate objective for a 
restraint. The problem, however, lies with the ambiguity of the term 
“quality.” Because varying degrees of quality exist, the ABA’s objective in 
accreditation cannot simply be expressed as quality protection, but must be 
refined to more accurately reflect the true goal of the ABA’s accreditation 
program. A more apt description of the ABA’s purpose is to protect and 
promote an elite-style legal education—arguably an illegitimate purpose that 
cannot justify the anticompetitive effects of its accreditation program. 
3. Promoting an Elite Model Law School Is Not a Legitimate 
Objective 
The preamble to the ABA standards states that the purpose of the 
requirements is to advance “the basic goal of providing a sound program of 
legal education.”286 No one can possibly find fault with that objective; the 
public is certainly better off without law schools offering unsound legal 
education programs. However, the generality of the term “sound program” is 
not very informative. To discern more precisely the ABA accreditation 
program’s objectives, it is necessary to look at the standards themselves. It is 
 
 
 285. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 666 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that “the payment 
of tuition in return for educational service constitutes commerce”). 
 286. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 26, pmbl. at 26. 
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not the purpose of this Article, however, to analyze the specific standards and 
determine their individual legality. Instead, this Article will draw from them 
an underlying theme, which reflects the overall objective of the program, and 
analyze the legitimacy of that objective. 
The standards set minimum requirements concerning operation of a law 
school, including its curriculum, faculty and administration, admissions, 
library resources, and physical facilities.
287
 They are seemingly aimed toward 
the objective of assuring that all law schools are operated along an elite 
school model.
288
 While there is no real definition of an “elite” school, most 
people have a general sense of what the term means. Elite schools typically 
have selective enrollment; educational programs predominantly taught by 
well-credentialed full-time faculty who engage in academic scholarship; a 
low student-faculty ratio; curricula with intellectual, rather than vocational, 
focus; physical facilities that are reasonably well appointed; and library 
collections that are quite extensive.
289
 
The ABA accreditation standards are generally consistent with these 
characteristics, as a few illustrations show. The requirement of a three-year 
program,
290
 coupled with the necessity of a bachelor’s degree for admission 
to law school,
291
 means that legal education is essentially a graduate course 
of study. Rules covering the student-faculty ratio, limiting the extent to which 
adjuncts may be counted in the calculation of that ratio,
292
 and requiring that 
full-time faculty teach first year courses
293
 all further the goal of assuring that 
full-time academics primarily teach the curriculum. 
Rules barring academic credit for bar review courses
294
 reflect the elite 
school view that education is not merely utilitarian, but is an intellectual 
exercise. Similarly, the rule prohibiting payment for externships
295
 reflects 
the elite opinion that externships should be an academic, not vocational, 
experience for students, and that payment might affect the nature of the work 
 
 
 287. See supra notes 23-29. 
 288. See supra notes 38-42, infra notes 290-99 and accompanying text. As previously noted, the 
term “elite-model” or “elite-style” law school, as used in this Article, refers to the form of educational 
system that is followed by all accredited law schools, not to the prestige factor of each law school. I 
recognize that some accredited law schools are considered more prestigious than others. However, my 
argument is that all accredited law schools, from the most prestigious to the least prestigious, follow an 
elite form of education, as required by the ABA accreditation system. 
 289. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. 
 290. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 26, std. 304(b). 
 291. Id. std. 502(a) (requiring a bachelor’s degree or completion of three-fourths of work toward a 
bachelor’s degree). 
 292. Id. std. 402, interps. 402-1, 402-2. 
 293. Id. std. 403(b). 
 294. Id. std. 302(f). 
 295. Id. std. 304, interp. 305-2. 
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given to students and jeopardize that ideal experience. Rules excluding 
correspondence schools
296
 and barring credit for such courses
297
 correlate 
with the view that a first-rate legal education should be an interactive 
experience involving person-to-person exchanges among students and 
faculty—not mere learning from books, tapes, and videos. Finally, standards 
relating to physical facilities,
298
 such as the library,
299
 are consistent with the 
common expectation that elite schools are not located in warehouses and that 
their library facilities and collections are reasonably large. 
But what motivates the ABA’s pursuit of the elite model?300 Some 
commentators have focused on the earlier legacy of ABA accreditation and 
argued that the ABA’s historical purpose was to exclude the poor, especially 
immigrants,
301
 and generally limit entry into the profession.
302
 Unfortunately, 
in the early to mid-twentieth century, the ABA’s efforts to control 
accreditation and its insistence on continually raising standards were, indeed, 
rooted in its desire to exclude “Jew boys,”303 immigrants, children of 
 
 
 296. Id. std. 304(b) (requiring a “course of study in residence”). 
 297. Id. std. 304(g). 
 298. Id. stds. 701-03. 
 299. Id. std. 606. 
 300. An examination of subjective intent is often useful in an analysis of professional restraints 
because their competitive effects are often ambiguous. While good intentions will not “save an 
otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse,” it has long been held that knowing the motive 
underlying a restraint can help with an interpretation of its effects. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United 
States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).  
 301. See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 74-124 (1976) (arguing that the 
“Harvardization” of legal education and other efforts to raise law school standards in the early 1900s 
masked hostility toward Jews and immigrants and were largely designed to exclude them from the 
profession); STEVENS, supra note 1, at 100-01, 126 n.18, 180 n.3, 184 n.41 (quoting numerous 
statements by leaders of the bar and legal academy that reveal hostility toward immigrants and Jews). 
The demonstrable elitism of American law schools in the early years is quite jarring. For example, the 
admissions literature of New York University School of Law for 1858-59 said that it was seeking a 
“class of young men, who are hereafter to control the mercantile and commercial interests of our 
country,” and the University of Georgia law school sought “young men who intend to devote 
themselves to the honorable employment of cultivating the estates they inherit from their fathers.” 
STEVENS, supra note 1, at 21 (internal citations omitted). See also infra notes 335-37 and 
accompanying text. 
 302. Chief Justice William Howard Taft reminded delegates at an ABA meeting to discuss legal 
education standards that “we have all the lawyers we need now, and there is likely to be no dearth of 
them.” Competition I, supra note 1, at 358 (footnote omitted). William Hadley, former Governor of 
Missouri and then-University of Colorado law professor, agreed with Taft and pointed out that the 
surplus of lawyers had not been sufficiently addressed in the discussions. Id. In a speech delivered as 
ABA President in 1916, Eliha Root noted that the “ease with which admission to the Bar is secured in 
many jurisdictions . . . has crowded the Bar with more lawyers than are necessary to do the business.” 
Id. at 358 n.274 (citation omitted). See also STEVENS, supra note 1, at 101 (describing the move to ban 
night and part-time law schools in the early to mid-1900s as motivated by “a confusing mix of public 
interest, economic opportunism, and ethnic prejudice”). 
 303. A prominent Philadelphia lawyer, at an ABA meeting in 1929 discussing law school 
requirements, noted that the “Russian Jew boys” needed a college education before being admitted to 
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immigrants, and the lower class.
304
 The record relating to discussions of law 
school standards and accreditation during that period is replete with 
unabashed comments from bar leaders about their desire to keep the legal 
profession a bastion of privileged “old-American” families.305 If this is, 
indeed, still the motivation behind the ABA’s insistence on an elite-style 
legal education for all law students, then the objective would not be 
legitimate and would not justify the restraints imposed. While the narrow-
minded bias of many bar leaders in the early twentieth century is appalling, 
there is no reason to attribute the same sinister motives to the ABA today. 
It has also been said that accreditation exists to allow law faculty to 
engage in price fixing: By averting competition from less expensive nonelite 
schools, legal educators enjoy higher salaries and benefits.
306
 While law 
professors certainly have self-interested concerns, the argument that the 
accreditation system is nothing but a price-fixing mechanism for legal 
educators’ salaries is unconvincing. Most of the accreditation standards do 
not relate, or are only remotely related, to faculty benefits.
307
 Moreover, 
many law professors, especially the more junior ones, could probably earn 
more by practicing law.
308
 Thus, there are easier ways for law school faculty 
 
 
law school so they could “absorb American ideals.” Competition I, supra note 1, at 363. The record 
does not reveal much discussion about keeping out African-Americans, but perhaps at that time it was 
almost a foregone conclusion that few blacks would be admitted to law schools. Thus they probably 
were not viewed as a threat to law schools and the profession. 
 304. Many in the legal profession considered the “‘influx of foreigners an uneducated mass of 
men who have no conception of our constitutional government’.” See STEVENS, supra note 1, at 101 
(endnote omitted). Some believed that “[y]ou can produce a moral and intelligent bar, by raising the 
standard, not only of education, but along economic lines so that every Tom, Dick and Harry cannot 
come to the Bar.”). See id. at 100 (endnote omitted). Most amusing was Yale’s fear that having a 
grade-based admissions criterion would lead to an “‘inferior student body ethically and socially’” 
because “foreign” students tended to have better grades than students of “old American” parentage. Id. 
at 101 (endnote omitted). 
 305. See supra notes 302-03; infra notes 336-37. 
 306. See Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 4, at 2221-23. 
 307. While the faculty, as users, do benefit from standards relating to physical facilities and 
library collections, it is hard to say that they are the primary intended beneficiaries of such standards. 
In addition, rules prohibiting payment for externships or limiting the hours of student employment do 
not, in any way, benefit legal educators. While one may disagree with the ABA philosophy underlying 
various other rules, such as the rules prohibiting correspondence schools or credit for bar review 
courses, it is a stretch to argue that the ABA promulgated these rules to benefit the faculty. Of all the 
current accreditation standards (disregarding those that have been eliminated or revised since the 1995 
consent decree), the only ones having a nontrivial bearing on faculty benefits are the standards 
governing the number of full-time faculty, the student-faculty ratio, and those requiring a three-year 
curriculum. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 22, stds. 402 & 304(b). 
 308. The median salary of first-year associates in firms of over 250 attorneys for the year 2000 
was $125,000 in the Northeast and $95,000 in the Midwest. These figures are clearly above the median 
salaries of assistant professors. See National Association for Law Placement (NALP) 2000 Associate 
Salary Survey, at http://www.nalp.org/press/asr00.htm (visited June 23, 2001). 
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to enjoy higher income than constructing and maintaining an elaborate 
accreditation scheme.
309
 
Law school accreditation, today, probably reflects a complex mix of 
motives. No doubt, many in the legal academy and legal profession do 
sincerely believe that, given the importance of law to our society, only an 
elite-style law school education will serve both law students and the public 
interest. But their conviction may have been at least subtly influenced by 
elitist concerns about professional status, income, and other matters unrelated 
to public interest.
310
 For example, there might be a fear that the image of the 
legal profession as a highly intellectual one would erode if standards were 
lowered. This erosion would deflate our collective egos and lead to a loss of 
stature and, possibly, income for the profession as a whole. 
Given the possible mix of motives, it is difficult to know whether the 
ABA has pursued the elite model because of a genuine belief that it is in the 
public interest or because of more selfish reasons. But a resolution of that 
question is not essential to determining whether the objective of fostering an 
elite system of legal education, and excluding all others, is a legitimate one. 
Even assuming complete good faith on the part of the ABA, the objective 
would still be illegitimate unless it is reasonable.
311
 
The objective would be reasonable if the nature of the legal profession 
calls for an elite-style legal education for all law students. There are 
obviously different views of the profession and its role in society. A grand 
vision, one that is often espoused at law school orientations or 
commencements, depicts attorneys as not just professionals handling legal 
tasks and handling them well, but as important guardians of democracy and 
the justice system.
312
 It stresses that lawyers have special responsibilities—
 
 
 309. Admittedly, there are different cost-benefits associated with academic careers and the 
practice of law. While salaries tend to be lower for academics than for large firm attorneys, law faculty 
rarely have to work as many hours or endure the same unrelenting pressure that practicing lawyers 
face. Some faculty also simply enjoy teaching or academic research and writing, and there is usually 
little time or opportunity for either activity in law practice. Thus, it is conceivable that law faculty may 
not be willing to give up an academic career for higher pay and may, instead, resort to price fixing in 
academia. Still, it seems overly cynical to suggest that accreditation’s primary object is to facilitate 
price fixing among faculty. 
 310. See Competition I, supra note 1, at 398 (quoting a critic of the legal education system who 
suggested that law schools’ preference for brilliant students does not have a sound basis, but rather 
stems from legal educators’ desire to have brighter students simply because they are “more fun to 
teach”). 
 311. See Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 719 F.2d 207, 227 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that if plaintiff 
chiropractors can show the anticompetitive effect of an AMA rule hindering competition from 
chiropractors, the defendants have the burden of showing, not only that they had a genuine concern 
about the scientific basis of chiropractic, but that the concern was “objectively reasonable”). 
 312. Many in the legal profession have historically held a highly exaggerated view of lawyers’ 
role in society and, therefore, the need for all lawyers to be people of exceptional intellect and training. 
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they hold positions of extraordinary power in government and private 
sectors, and they play a unique role in shaping law and society.
313
 If this view 
of the legal profession is accurate, and most law students are expected to 
become important national or state leaders, judges, and major policy makers, 
then assuring that all law schools follow the elite model might be a valid 
objective on the premise that only an elite-style education can produce 
intelligent, reflective, and socially responsible leaders.
314
 
Most attorneys must surely recognize that this inflated image of law and 
the profession does not describe the reality.
315
 Only a small percentage of law 
students, even at the top schools, will ever play a truly significant role in 
society’s power structure or otherwise have the kind of impact suggested by 
this grandiose view.
316
 Thus, the objective of ensuring that all law students 
receive an elite, first-rate legal education cannot reasonably be based on this 
lofty notion of the important societal impact of all lawyers. 
A more realistic view of the profession is that most lawyers simply 
practice law, just as other professionals practice their respective professions. 
The question is then whether, given this reality, the ABA’s objective of 
having an exclusively elite legal education system is legitimate. I conclude 
that it is not. A traditional (i.e., elite-style) law school education may well be 
more enriching and probably produces more critical and creative thinkers. 
But simply because it is better does not necessarily mean that the alternative 
must be inadequate. Given the opportunity, for example, most of us would 
probably have chosen for ourselves (and our children) an elite undergraduate 
college that instills students with a love of James Joyce and the “great 
books,” that employs an intellectually stimulating faculty with eclectic ideas, 
that has a library with a broad collection of books, and that provides an 
 
 
See AUERBACH, supra note 301, at 64 (quoting the president of the American Bar Association stating, 
in 1915, that law was “as omniscient and omnipotent as God because it is an attribute of God, and its 
home is the bosom of God”); ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 5 
(1953) (describing the legal profession as the “[p]ursuit of the learned art in the spirit of a public 
service” where “[g]aining a livelihood is incidental”). 
 313. See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 13 (1988) 
(describing the typical “Law Day Sermon” about lawyers’ “public duties, being officers of the court 
and so on,” as “aspirational . . . inspirational, boozily solemn, [and] anything but real”). 
 314. See AUERBACH, supra note 301, at 82-83 (describing efforts made by Roscoe Pound and 
others to ensure that students are prepared, not only for a career at the bar, but to be reformists and 
leaders, and that law professors are equipped to “fit new generations of lawyers to lead the people”).  
 315. Inspirational, and aspirational, speeches exhorting lawyers and law students to serve society 
are, of course, entirely appropriate. My point is simply that one must not lose sight of the fact that 
many, if not most, lawyers simply engage in the mundane practice of law. 
 316. Many more law students will probably apply their legal training to lead in various capacities 
in their communities; for example, they may serve on zoning boards or local school boards. This 
Article does not mean to minimize these contributions. However, it is doubtful that these roles, 
important as they may be, require an elite-style legal education. 
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idyllic environment for work and play. But no one would suggest that a 
nonelite college education is necessarily unacceptable or that only colleges 
providing an elite education and experience are worthy of existence. 
Some may argue that law school is different from undergraduate college, 
and that the subtleties of the law call for an elite approach. The gist of this 
argument is that law is not just the embodiment of doctrine consisting of 
bodies of rules that can be mastered simply by learning different tests, 
prongs, and requirements. Rather, it involves theory and policy as well, 
which require critical, creative, and more nuanced thinking. To the extent 
that law is not merely accumulated rules to be mechanically applied, one 
could argue that it is necessary to learn the breadth and limitation of the rules 
in order to know when and how to argue for modifying, extending, or 
rejecting them. One could also argue that because law is often indeterminate, 
uncertain, and even conflicting, studying law involves learning not just 
dogma, but how legal issues are resolved given this “messiness.” Finally, of 
course, lawyers must learn to write persuasively and to “think on their feet.” 
Under this vision of the study of law, it is quite possible to justify the 
elite-model law school. If the study of law entails more than learning the 
tools-of-the-trade, then it might not be unreasonable, for example, to require 
full-time faculty to teach classes rather than adjuncts because full-time 
faculty generally engage in academic research and writing that should raise 
the intellectual content of their teaching.
317
 Part-time adjuncts, in contrast, 
seldom have time in their busy practices to veer from the nuts-and-bolts of 
practice to think about theory, policy, or other broader issues. Similarly, the 
requirement of a three-year full-time J.D. program would not be 
unreasonable, even if a shorter program might be sufficient to train a 
competent practitioner, because it would give students breadth of knowledge 
by allowing them to take in a variety of nondogma or interdisciplinary 
seminars.
318
 
I do not take issue with the big picture of law, or even with the notion that 
the elite model is usually more conducive to gaining a deeper understanding 
of law and becoming a thoughtful legal thinker.
319
 There is also general 
 
 
 317. It has been suggested that this standard is primarily intended to protect the interests of full-
time faculty, by preventing schools from hiring less expensive adjuncts. See Shepherd & Shepherd, 
supra note 4, at 2138. 
 318. A more selfish motive for the three-year program requirement has also been suggested—law 
schools benefit financially from a longer course of study. See Competition I, supra note 1, at 337-38. 
 319. From my experience in practice, I am not persuaded, however, that an attorney with a deeper 
intellectual understanding of the law would necessarily always be a better practitioner. Appreciating 
both the strengths and weaknesses of the efficient breach theory of contract law, for example, 
generally does not help one either draft a contract or litigate a breach of contract claim. 
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consensus that legal education has improved significantly in the last several 
decades,
320
 and that may be a tribute to the elite model. However, the mere 
fact that one model may be preferable to another, everything else being 
equal, does not necessarily mean that the latter should be banned or 
disadvantaged. If modest, low-budget law schools can adequately train 
students to become competent practitioners in many areas of the law, then 
there is no legitimate reason to exclude them. 
Many legal practices, such as home closings, simple wills, and other 
simple uncontested matters, involve primarily following forms or routines. 
Such work rarely requires much legal analysis or even resort to the legal 
rules underlying the legal mechanics. In other areas, such as immigration, 
effective lawyering may be primarily a matter of learning bureaucratic rules 
and having the interpersonal skills and patience to deal with both desperate 
(or difficult) clients and intractable government agencies.
321
 Even some 
business matters, such as the buying and selling of small businesses,
322
 or 
simple breach-of-contract actions,
323
 involve very routine legal work. 
Representation of clients in these matters seldom requires complex legal 
 
 
 320. See Lee Bolinger, The Mind in the Major American Law School, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2167, 
2170-71 (1993) (stating that there is a greater depth of intellectual sophistication in law schools today, 
and that students are better educated); Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary 
Americans, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 548 (1994) (observing that legal education has improved 
dramatically, and the range of difference between top and bottom schools has narrowed substantially). 
However, law schools today have also been criticized for not adequately preparing law students for the 
actual practice of law. See John S. Elson, Why and How the Practicing Bar Must Rescue American 
Legal Education from the Misguided Priorities of American Legal Academia, 64 TENN. L. REV. 1135, 
1135 (1997) (arguing that law schools “graduate students who are by and large unprepared to practice 
law competently and ethically”); The Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the 
Gap, Legal Education and Professional Development: An Educational Continuum, 1992 A.B.A. SEC. 
OF LEGAL & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR 6 (criticizing many aspects of law school education today, 
including its insufficient focus on practical skills and practical considerations, and its lack of 
connection with the real practice of law) [hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT]. 
 321. See Deborah L. Rhode, Professionalism in Perspective: Alternative Approaches to 
Nonlawyer Practice, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 701, 709 (1996) (arguing that three years of 
law school is “neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure competence” in areas such as “divorce, 
landlord-tenant disputes, bankruptcy, immigration, welfare claims, tax preparation, and real estate 
transactions”). 
 322. While such transactions involve a lot of document preparation and “due diligence,” the work 
itself is quite routine where the business being purchased is relatively small. Most attorneys probably 
have a checklist of items that must be done in addition to drafting the relevant documents—such as, in 
the case of representing purchasers, ordering a title search to ensure that there are no undisclosed liens 
or encumbrances on the property; reviewing leases and contracts to ensure that the sale does not 
constitute breach of any such lease or contract; obtaining consents from affected third parties where 
necessary; obtaining appropriate transfers and assignments of transferable contracts and leases; and 
including an appropriate noncompete agreement. None of these activities requires thorough 
understanding of complex legal analysis. 
 323. For such simple litigation, knowledge of basic civil procedure and local rules, rules of 
evidence, and rules and practices regarding execution of judgment is generally sufficient. 
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analysis, let alone an understanding of abstract legal theories. A strong case 
can be made that lawyers who primarily engage in these kinds of practice do 
not require a legal education that thoroughly teaches critical thinking, broad 
legal theories, or even sophisticated analysis, although such an education 
would undoubtedly be more enriching.  
If law practice, in many instances, does not require the extent of learning 
that the ABA deems necessary, then imposing the ABA’s concept of legal 
education (i.e., the elite model) is unreasonable. This assertion does not mean 
that there should be no standards or that the free market should control legal 
education. My argument is merely that the ABA’s objective cannot be to 
categorically exclude schools that subscribe to a different educational policy 
or have more modest goals. Instead, the objective should be to ensure that 
law schools adequately train students to become competent and ethical 
practitioners. And the standards should be sufficiently flexible to allow 
alternative or low-cost schools, such as MSL and Concord, to demonstrate 
that their unorthodox models are fully capable of providing an education of 
acceptable quality for the kinds of practice that their students are likely to 
pursue. 
4. Restraint Reasonably Necessary for Objective, and Least Restrictive 
Alternatives 
If the ABA’s objective of requiring an elite legal education system is 
unreasonable, then the restraint on competition resulting from the 
accreditation standards would be illegal, and there would be no need for 
further inquiry. If the objective is not unreasonable, however, the restraint 
would be justified unless it is not reasonably necessary for the achievement 
of the lawful objective, or the objective can be attained through less 
constraining means.
324
 This Article does not explore this issue in detail, for 
its intention is to look at the anticompetitive effects and other implications of 
the overall ABA accreditation scheme, not to analyze the vulnerability of 
specific standards, which would require more data and a case-by-case 
determination. Instead, this part of the Article will merely note what might 
suffice to meet this burden, should courts consider the ABA’s objective 
 
 
 324. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 14 (1945) (suggesting that, though 
efficiencies may justify news agencies combining resources to gather news, the membership restriction 
was unnecessary and illegal for the achievement of the benefit); United States v. Addyston Pipe & 
Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (holding that a restraint ancillary 
to a legitimate main purpose is reasonable only if it is necessary for the attainment of the legitimate 
purpose and does not exceed “the necessity presented”). See also supra note 232 and accompanying 
text. 
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legitimate. 
Showing that a specific standard does not actually achieve the legitimate 
objective can defeat the defendant’s justification.325 For example, assume 
that the general purpose of the rule prohibiting credit for bar review courses 
is to ensure that students are taught, not only black-letter law, but also the 
subtleties and nuances of law. Even if courts consider this objective 
legitimate, a plaintiff challenging the standard might still prevail if it can be 
proven that the standard does not, in fact, achieve its stated objective. The 
plaintiff could accomplish this, for example, by demonstrating that this rule 
(or any other rule for that matter) does not prohibit professors from teaching 
in a style that focuses exclusively on black-letter law in “regular” courses. In 
fact, neither this nor any other rule covers acceptable and unacceptable 
teaching methods at all, thus exposing the futility of the bar review course 
restriction.  
As another illustration, the standard and interpretations relating to 
student-faculty ratio are presumably grounded on the assumption that they 
facilitate smaller classes, promote student-faculty interaction, and ensure that 
the school’s educational program is taught primarily by full-time faculty 
whose academic scholarship informs their teaching. A plaintiff challenging 
these standards can point to the fact that the rules do not provide for a yearly 
minimum number of small class offerings. Nor do they set the maximum 
class size for “core” courses, which generally have much higher enrollment 
than electives. One might reason that these omissions demonstrate the rule’s 
ineffectiveness in promoting small classes. Similarly, because faculty are not 
required to interact with students or to engage in legal scholarship, it can be 
argued that this rule does not, in fact, achieve the claimed objective of 
promoting student-faculty exchanges or faculty scholarship. 
A plaintiff can also defeat the defendant’s justification for a restraint with 
evidence that a method less restrictive of competition might achieve the same 
legitimate objective.
326
 For example, assume that the rule prohibiting 
correspondence schools is intended to foster live exchange of ideas among 
students and between students and faculty, and that this objective is 
legitimate. Plaintiffs might still be able to invalidate this rule if they show 
that the objective of having real-time exchanges can be accomplished in a 
 
 
 325. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 114 
(1984) (finding that the restraint—packaging college football games and limiting the number of times 
they are broadcasted on television—is not really necessary for the attainment of the restraint’s 
legitimate objective). 
 326. See id. at 119 (stating, in response to defendant’s claim that limiting the number of television 
broadcasts of each college’s football games promoted competitive balance among the teams, that the 
balance could be better accomplished through NCAA rules directly governing those matters). 
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manner less constraining of competition. Perhaps plaintiffs can demonstrate 
that Internet technology has made it possible for “chat room” discussions led 
by professors to simulate classroom interaction. Therefore, even a completely 
on-line law school, such as Concord, may be able to provide the kind of real-
time exchange that is presumably the objective of the correspondence school 
ban. A standard requiring merely that all legal educational programs provide 
a forum for real-time classroom discussion (either in-person or “live” via the 
Internet) should be sufficient to achieve the stated objective. Such a rule 
would have less anticompetitive impact than a blanket prohibition of all 
correspondence schools because it would not automatically exclude all on-
line legal educational programs, but only those that are unable, or unwilling, 
to provide the means for simulated “live” classrooms.  
Although many of the ABA accreditation standards are most likely 
anticompetitive, an antitrust approach may not be the best way to bring about 
fundamental reform with broad-ranging educational implications. Courts 
may be unwilling to review policy choices reflected in the accrediting 
standards or to substitute their own opinions for those of the ABA, except 
where the practices closely resemble per se violations (and those have been 
largely eliminated by the consent decree). There would also be the difficulty 
of fashioning an appropriate remedy. If the current standards are drastically 
eased, it would seem that the remedy must also include some mechanism to 
protect the public from unqualified lawyers. Fashioning such a remedy 
would draw the court into a larger policy making role than it might care to 
assume, or should assume. For these reasons, notwithstanding its 
anticompetitiveness, the ABA accreditation process may be able to withstand 
future antitrust challenges. 
V. SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF AN ELITE LAW SCHOOL SYSTEM 
Nevertheless, the ABA should consider revamping its standards 
voluntarily, not only because they are anticompetitive, but also because doing 
so would diversify the student pool and possibly also increase affordable 
access to legal services for lower-income individuals. Under the rule of 
reason, it is true that noneconomic social concerns are generally deemed 
irrelevant.
327
 The social implications of an elite policy toward law school 
accreditation neither add to nor militate against its anticompetitiveness as a 
legal matter. However, they should certainly be relevant when questioning 
whether the ABA is right in effectuating and maintaining that policy. 
 
 
 327. See supra notes 269-72 and accompanying text. 
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A. Effect on the Composition of Law School Student Body and of the 
Profession 
Lawyers and law students disproportionately come from privileged 
backgrounds.
328
 For example, a 1970s study of a group of elite and semi-elite 
law schools showed that the majority of their students came from relatively 
high-status families.
329
 A remarkable 50% of the sample had fathers with 
college degrees (another 16% had attended some college),
330
 at a time when 
only 15% of all white men had graduated from college.
331
 A number of 
studies on the class origins of lawyers similarly found significant 
overrepresentation of people from high socioeconomic circumstances.
332
 
This skewed social composition of the profession appears to be worsening.
333
 
For example, one study of law schools in the 1990s shows that a whopping 
61.68% of students in the top American law schools had fathers who had 
attended graduate or professional schools.
334
 
In the early part of the twentieth century, the bias in favor of the socially 
and economically privileged was apparently intentional.
335
 The lengths to 
which the legal academy and the profession were then willing to go to keep 
the profession an exclusive club are almost laughable.
336
 Dean Thomas Swan 
 
 
 328. ABEL, supra note 1, at 87-90 (describing many empirical studies showing that a 
disproportionate number of attorneys and law students, throughout the history of this country, come 
from privileged backgrounds). See also JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: 
THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 186 (1982). 
 329. Robert B. Stevens, Law School and Law Students, 59 VA. L. REV. 551, 573, 600 tbl.29, 601 
tbl.30 (1973) (showing, from a sample of white law students at eight elite and semielite law schools in 
1970 and 1972, that 14% of the students came from families with incomes over $40,000, at a time 
when only about 14% of all American families had incomes exceeding just $15,000; 85.5% of the 
students’ fathers were in white-collar occupations, about 50% of the students’ parents had college 
degrees and another 16% had attended some college). 
 330. Id. at 601 tbl.30. 
 331. ABEL, supra note 1, at 51. 
 332. See id. at 87-89. 
 333. See HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 245, at 186 (showing, from a study of a large number of 
Chicago lawyers, that over seventy-three percent had fathers who held professional, managerial, or 
technical positions). 
 334. LINDA F. WIGHTMAN, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS COUNCIL, LEGAL EDUCATION AT THE 
CLOSE OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: DESCRIPTIONS AND ANALYSES OF STUDENTS, FINANCING, AND 
PROFESSIONAL EXPECTATIONS AND ATTITUDES 33 tbl.17 (1995). 
 335. See supra notes 301-05 and accompanying text. 
 336. Yale was particularly obsessed with “the Jewish problem.” See ABEL, supra note 1, at B5. 
Dean Thomas Swan suggested that students with foreign born parents should be required to complete 
more years of pre-law college studies. See id.; STEVENS, supra note 1, at 101. John Henry Wigmore 
urged cutting the number of attorneys in half by requiring two years of college, which would reduce 
the “spawning mass of promiscuous semi-intelligence which now enters the bar.” See ABEL, supra 
note 1, at 47. Leaders of the bar were not embarrassed at all about explicitly expressing their desire to 
raise standards, “not only of education, but along economic lines,” to exclude the socially undesirable. 
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of Yale Law School, for example, argued in the 1920s against using grades 
as an admissions criterion because immigrants and children of immigrants—
the nonelite—performed as well if not better than students of “better” 
parentage, and Yale would therefore become a school with an “inferior 
student body ethically and socially.”337 It would be unfair to say that leaders 
of the bar and legal academy today are consciously pursuing an elitist policy 
in its accreditation process for the purpose of keeping out the low and 
working class. But, no matter how well-intentioned, the ABA policy of 
excluding or disadvantaging nonelite law schools has a disparate impact on 
qualified lower-income students and is just as undesirable. 
Attending law school is expensive. Today, law school tuition can range 
from almost $10,000 a year for state schools to $30,000 for private 
schools.
338
 The high tuition is partially due to the demanding standards 
imposed, such as the library and physical facilities rules and the student-
faculty ratio rules, which are all expensive to satisfy.
339
 Adding to the already 
high tuition costs are the indirect opportunity costs that law students must 
also bear, some of which are also attributable to restrictive ABA standards. 
For example, standards limiting student employment, prohibiting pay for 
academic externships, and requiring a lengthy term of study all increase the 
amount of income that students must forego when they attend law school.
340
 
Legal education with fewer frills can be offered at a significantly lower 
cost. For instance, tuition at Concord, the Internet law school, is only $5,000 
for the year 2001, and at MSL, it was $10,800 in the year 2000—merely 25% 
and 55%, respectively, of the average tuition at private law schools during 
the same period.
341
 Suppressing these “low-brow” law schools on the basis of 
their failure to meet certain elite-based criteria not only denies all students a 
 
 
See STEVENS, supra note 1, at 100. 
 337. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 101. Interestingly, some of the same biased concerns about an 
ethnic group “taking over” and “bringing down” an elite school are being voiced about Asian-
Americans today, and efforts have been made at the University of California, Berkeley, (and perhaps 
elsewhere) to minimize, in undergraduate admissions, the importance of grades and test scores, which 
Asian-American students tend to do well in, and to emphasize more subjective factors such as 
“leadership” and extracurricular activities, areas in which Asian-Americans are perceived as weaker. 
See Linda Mathews, When Being Best Isn’t Good Enough: Why Yat-Pang Au Won’t Be Going to 
Berkeley, L.A. TIMES, July 19, 1987, at 22. 
 338. OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA-APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS, supra note 3, at 39; BARRON’S GUIDE, 
supra note 3. In addition to tuition, there are living and book expenses which, for 1999-2000, averaged 
$8,647 for students living on campus and $12,054 for those living off campus per year. Am. Bar 
Ass’n, Average Living and Book Expenses, at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/statistics/living.html 
(last visited June 16, 2001). One estimate for the total cost of a three-year private law school education 
is $140,000. OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA-APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS, supra note 3, at 39. 
 339. See supra notes 292-93, 297-99 and accompanying text. 
 340. See supra notes 290 & 295 and accompanying text. 
 341. See supra note 242. 
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quality-price tradeoff choice, but it also has the invidious effect of 
disproportionately screening out students from more modest backgrounds. It 
stands to reason that when law school is very expensive, poorer students will 
be able to attend only if they can obtain sufficient scholarship assistance or 
are willing to take on massive student loans. For students whose families’ 
annual incomes may have never exceeded $18,000,
342
 for example, the 
thought of carrying loans several times that amount
343
 can be so daunting that 
many may be discouraged from attending or even applying to law school.
344
 
B. Effect on Access to Legal Services for People of Low or Modest 
Incomes 
Surprising as it may seem in a country that is often said to be 
overlawyered and overlitigious,
345
 there is in fact too little access to 
affordable legal services for many individuals. In a broad critique of the 
American legal system, Derek Bok, former dean of Harvard Law School, 
charged that the system is “grossly inequitable and inefficient,”346 with “far 
too much law for those who can afford it and far too little for those who 
 
 
 342. An annual household income of $18,000 for a family of four is just above the poverty 
threshold of $17,761 for the year 2000. See U.S. Census Bureau, Poverty Thresholds 2000, available 
at http://www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/threshld/thresh00.html (last visited June 16, 2001). 
 343. See Margaret Graham Tebo, The Debt Conundrum, ABA J. Mar. 2001, at 42; Law School 
Admissions Council, available at http://www.lsat.org/LSAC.asp?url=/lsac/financial-aid-repayment.asp 
(last visited June 16, 2001) (reporting that, for the period 1999-2000, the average debt for law school 
graduates who borrowed both federal and privately guaranteed student loans was about eighty 
thousand dollars). 
 344. Furthermore, it is generally known that people of lower income tend to marry and have other 
family and financial responsibilities at a younger age. Lower tuition will ease the financial burden of 
law school, making it less difficult for qualified but poorer students to attend. 
 345. See Derek C. Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 570, 
571 (1983); Richard H. Sander & E. Douglass Williams, Why Are There So Many Lawyers?, 
Perspectives on a Turbulent Market, 14 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 431 (1989). Derek Bok lamented that too 
many exceptionally talented people are diverted into law, which adds little to “the economy, the 
pursuit of culture, or the enhancement of the human spirit” when “the country cries out for more 
talented business executives, more enlightened public servants, more inventive engineers, more able 
high school principals and teachers.” Id. at 573. Others, however, disagree with that critique. See 
DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER (1989) (arguing that whether a particular claim is 
frivolous depends on normative judgments); Lawrence M. Friedman, Litigation in Society, 15 ANN. 
REV. SOC. 17, 27 (1989) (arguing that litigation has brought immeasurable benefits to women and 
minorities, expanded civil liberties, ensured fair procedures and placed limits on government); Marc 
Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 38 (1986) (arguing that the 
“consternation about litigation” is due, not so much to the actual number of suits brought, but the sense 
of being held accountable and the fear “about what courts might do”); Marc Galanter, Reading the 
Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly 
Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983) (contending that the claim of a litigation 
explosion is a myth). 
 346. Bok, supra note 345, at 571. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
     
 
 
 
 
 
1100 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 79:1035 
 
 
 
 
cannot.”347 Several studies confirm that the legal needs of many low- to 
moderate-income Americans are, indeed, unmet. For example, a 1994 ABA 
survey showed that 61% of moderate-income respondents with legal 
problems did not consult a lawyer.
348
 Another ABA study reported that, in 
1990, 52% of all divorces in the United States were obtained without a 
lawyer, and at least one party was unrepresented or defaulted in 88% of other 
litigated family law claims.
349
 
A few commentators have attributed this access problem to the fact that 
the bulk of our legal resources, including the time and energy of most of our 
numerous lawyers, are devoted to corporate clients and well-to-do 
individuals, and that only a small percentage go toward meeting the legal 
needs of ordinary Americans.
350
 Another reason may be the high costs of 
legal services, except perhaps for routine legal work such as house closings 
and simple wills.
351
 Relaxing accreditation standards may increase the 
number of lawyers primarily serving individual clients. The increased supply, 
along with the fact that these graduates would have a smaller educational cost 
to recoup, might lead to a reduction in legal fees.
352
  
This is not to suggest that high tuition is the leading cause for expensive 
legal services
353
 or that relaxing accreditation standards that lead to high 
 
 
 347. Id. 
 348. See ROY W. REESE & CAROLYN A. ELDRED, ABA, LEGAL NEEDS AMONG LOW-INCOME 
AND MODERATE INCOME HOUSEHOLDS: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM THE COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL 
NEEDS STUDY (1994). 
 349. See STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES, ABA, RESPONDING TO 
THE NEEDS OF THE SELF-REPRESENTED DIVORCE LITIGANT 7 (1994). 
 350. A 1995 study of the Chicago bar revealed that in 1995, 61% of the total legal work 
performed by the Chicago bar was devoted to corporate clients, and 29% to personal clients. John P. 
Heinz et al., The Changing Character of Lawyers’ Work: Chicago in 1975 and 1995, 32 L. & SOC’Y 
REV. 751, 765 tbl.3 (1998). The “personal plight” segment, which was defined to include civil rights, 
family, immigration, employment, plaintiff personal injury, criminal defense, accounted for only 
sixteen percent. Id. See generally Galanter, supra note 245 (generally emphasizing that organizational 
clients dominate the legal system). 
 351. Deborah Rhode, a strong proponent of nonlawyer practice, has written extensively on the 
costs of legal services and the need to increase the poor’s access to such services through nonlawyer 
practice. See, e.g., Ralph C. Cavanaugh & Deborah L. Rhode, The Unauthorized Practice of Law and 
Pro Se Divorce: An Empirical Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 104 (1976); Deborah L. Rhode, The Delivery of 
Legal Services by Non-Lawyers, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 209 (1990). 
 352. It is unlikely, however, that relaxing accreditation standards and approving schools with less 
rigorous programs would have much effect on the legal fees of corporate clients. As previously noted, 
there is a structural divide in the legal profession between corporate representation and individual-
client service, and there is little competition between the two groups. Given the hierarchy of the legal 
profession, most graduates from the new, less expensive programs would probably work in the 
individual-client service segment and, therefore, not pose a competitive threat to the corporate sector. 
Nonetheless, the possibility that loosening accreditation standards might increase access to legal 
services for those with less income is an additional point in favor of change. 
 353. See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice 
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tuition will solve the perplexing problem of unequal access.
354
 The legal 
process itself is expensive, and it may take “delegalization,” favored by 
Bok,
355
 or other drastic fundamental changes to the system
356
 to make legal 
services affordable.
357
 Still, it is logical to expect some reduction in legal 
fees, at least in the personal client market, if the costs of attending law school 
were to decline because these costs are inevitably built into the fee structure 
of legal services. Today, the cost of attending a private law school, even 
without taking into account the opportunity costs of foregone income, is 
approximately $140,000,
358
 and one commentator estimates that it adds 
approximately twenty dollars per billable hour to legal fees.
359
  
While a substantial lowering of the accreditation standards might lead to 
more affordable legal services for low-income people, it also presents an 
increased risk of harm to clients. But states can minimize this risk if they 
simultaneously adopt a more comprehensive scheme for client protection 
than is in existence today. This scheme might include requiring some form of 
disclosure to potential clients regarding the nature and extent of training that 
the attorney has received, changing the nature of the bar examinations, or 
strengthening the state bars’ disciplinary procedures in order to more 
efficiently sanction or disbar incompetent practitioners. It is not the purpose 
of this Article to discuss or recommend any client protection mechanisms, 
but only to suggest that there are ways to increase client protection if 
accreditation barriers are eased. 
 
 
System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 968-82 (1999-2000) (analyzing reasons for the astronomical costs of 
legal services in general). 
 354. For a discussion of the problem of access to legal services, see generally DEBORAH L. RHODE 
& DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 784-894 (1992); Cramton, supra note 245. 
 355. Bok, supra note 345, at 579-80 (urging a combination of delegalization and better access to 
justice). Delegalization means simplifying rules and procedures, standardizing forms, and eliminating 
burdensome personal appearances in many instances. Id. 
 356. See Deborah L. Rhode, Professionalism in Perspective: Alternative Approaches to 
Nonlawyer Practice, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 701, 713-16 (1996) (advocating changes to 
unauthorized practice rules to permit nonlawyer practice in routine areas of the law, in order to 
increase access to legal services). Another issue that is often debated is the form-of-practice 
restrictions prohibiting lawyers from practicing in any association in which a nonlawyer owns an 
interest. The removal of this restriction would allow, for example, Sears to open a law clinic and might 
bring down the costs of legal services. This issue, along with multistate and other emerging issues 
relating to increasing competition in legal services, will not be discussed in this Article. 
 357. There are now also various self-help aids available, such as do-it-yourself divorce kits and 
software for wills and personal bankruptcy petitions, that bypass attorneys altogether. The result is a 
reduction in legal fees in those areas. 
 358. See OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA-APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS, supra note 3, at 39. 
 359. See Cramton, supra note 245, at 550. 
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CONCLUSION 
The ABA’s accreditation standards reflect the profession’s preference for 
the elite-model law school. As a historical matter, that preference had little 
impact until the ABA succeeded in securing the backing of most states, in the 
form of bar admission requirements that effectively foreclosed other options. 
It is the states’ action in giving effect to the ABA’s accreditation decisions 
that have, in the past, shielded the organization from private antitrust 
challenges relating to its accreditation activities. Despite the ABA’s previous 
successes, which were grounded on state action and petitioning immunity 
doctrines, I have argued that these doctrines should not extend to the setting 
and enforcement of the accreditation standards themselves, as distinct from 
the accreditation decisions and the use of those decisions. 
On the issue of anticompetitiveness, I have concluded that many of the 
standards are unreasonable and, therefore, anticompetitive, because they 
perpetuate the elite-model law school and exclude others, even though a 
nonelite legal education is perfectly adequate for many types of legal 
practice. However, given the broad policy implications of any decision to 
fundamentally change the accreditation system, courts might be reluctant to 
second-guess the ABA. Nonetheless, this Article argues for voluntary 
reforms from the profession because the elite model, though perhaps better in 
the absolute sense, is not only unnecessary for many practitioners, but also 
has the unintended consequence of keeping the profession largely a bastion 
of the privileged. 
Change is inevitable. The ABA’s leadership in legal education ultimately 
depends on its ability to retain its reputation and credibility with the states. 
Should it lose that credibility because its standards are eventually perceived 
as elitist or self-serving, some states might withdraw their reliance on ABA 
approval, which would cause important changes in the profession. It would 
be in the profession’s best interests to take the lead in the process of change 
than to have changes proceed without its participation or influence. 
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